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Summary findings
Glaessner  and  Valdes-Prieto  provide  a framework  in  developing  countries  and  the countries  from  which
which  small countries  can  assess the  proper  role  for the  financial  services  are imported.
state  and the private  sector  in pension  policy.  Based on  - The  unbundling  of pension  services is more
industrial  organization  theory  and pension  economics,  advantageous  in small  than  in large countries.
this framework  draws  on  experience  in small  countries.  The  collection  of contributions  and  the payment  of
The  authors  identify  how  optimal  pension  policies  can  benefits  (which are  subject  to substantial  economies  of
change  in small countries  (those with  fewer  than  1  scale for  smail countries)  shouid  be mandatorilv
million  active  contributors  to pension  funds),  explore  unbundled  from  other  pension  services.
optimal  pension  reform  design  for  small  countries,  and  - Those  services should  be provided  separately  to
incorporate  other  stylized  assumptions  about  small  ensure  competition  in the  selection  of trustees  and
countries  into  the discussion:  the relatively  greater  competitive  investment  managenenrt  services.  This type
international  mobility  of labor  and  capital,  the greater  of pension  system  design  may  be preferable  to having  a
scarcity  of human  capital  specialized  in financial  foreign  firm  provide  all pension  services.
supervision  and tax  administration,  fewer  independent  When  other  assumptions  (such  as susceptiblity  to
interests,  and higher  political  volatility  and  risk over  long  large gross  migration  flows) are  combined  with  the
time horizons.  assumption  of a small-country  base, mandatory  pension
They  conclude  that:  systems  or fiscal incentives  are  found  to  be less effective
For  small  countries  the  Chilean  model  should  be  in small  than  in large countries.  Large  countries  have
modified  to include  greater  reliance  on international  broader  contribution  bases  and rmuch smaller  gross
trade  in financial  services  - especially  services  that  migration  flows,  making  them  demographically  more
benefit  from  economies  of scale and  scope,  such  as  stable.
collections,  account  processing,  and  benefit  payments.  The relatively  greater  international  migration  in
Such an  approach  would  require  a greater  harmonization  small  countries  makes  full funding  of pension  systems
of accounting  and regulatory  standards  benveen  small  even  more  important  in small  than  in large  countries.
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ABSTRACT
This  paper provides a  framework within which small countries can  assess the proper role of the
private sector and the  state in pension policy. This framework is based on  industrial organization
theory and pension economics and draws upon small country experiences. The paper identifies how
optimal pension policies can change in small countries, defined as having one million or fewer active
contributors to pension funds.  After exploring optimal pension reform design given this one small
country characteristic (e.g., one million or fewer active contributors), other stylized assumptions about
small countries are incorporated into the discussion.  These assumptions include: relatively greater
international mobility of labor and capital, greater scarcity of human capital specialized in financial
supervision and tax administration, fewer independent interests, and higher political volatility and risk
over long time horizons.  An important conclusion of the paper, which rests only on the assumption of
a small contribution base, is that the "Chilean model" should be modified to include greater reliance
on inlernational trade  in financial services.  This applies especially to services subject to substantial
economies of scope and scale, such as account processing, collections, and payment of benefits.  Such
an approach would  require greater harmonization in accounting and regulatory standards between
small  developing  countries  and  countries  from which  financial  services  are  imported.  Another
important finding is that unbundling of pension services is more advantageous in small than in large
countries.  Collection  of contributions and payment  of benefits, which  are  subject to  substantial
econcimies  of scale in the small country case, should be mandatorily unbundled from other pension
services.  These services  should be provided separately to ensure  competition in the  selection of
trustees and competitive  investment management services.  Moreover, it is shown that this type of
pension system design may be preferable to the option of having a foreign firm provide all pension
services.  When other assumptions (e.g., susceptibility to relatively greater gross migration flows) are
combined with the small contribution base, it is found that in small  countries, mandatory pension
systems or fiscal  incentives are less effective than in large countries.  Large countries have broader
contribution bases and  much  smaller gross migration  flows, making  them  demographically more
stable.  Finally, the relatively greater intemational migration in small countries makes full funding of
pension systems even more important than in large countries.v 
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
A.  Background
1.  Throughout  the  world,  countries  of all  sizes face difficult  decisions  about  how  best  to
provide  pensions that  cover  disability,  survivors,  and  old  age.  Although  a  growing  body  of
literalture addresses generic issues in designing pension reforms (see World Bank,  1994; Valdes-
Prieto,  1994), not much attention  has been paid to special issues in designing  pension reforms  in
small countries.  This paper is devoted to the many small countries now in the process of reforming
their social security  systems that are confronting special pension policy problems  related to their
size.  Pension policy in this report concerns intervention by a national government  to improve the
economic  well  being of its  people through  pensions.  This definition  leaves  aside  other  social
forces  that  affect  economic  well being  in old age, such as the family,  communal  organizations,
friendly  associations,  and  private  charity.  It also  leaves out  retiree  health  benefits  and  other
national subsidy programs for the old.
2.  Several characteristics of small developing countries make optimal pension policies, at both
the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, different from those of larger countries.  Perhaps the
single  most  important  and  noncontroversial  characteristic of  small  countries  is  the  number  of
contributors to pension funds.  For this purpose, small countries are defined as having one million or
fewer workers employed in the formal sector; the relatively smaller number of workers covered by
the pension system in a small country can result in a less than minimum efficient scale in provision of
some pension services.  In addition to the relatively smaller base of contributors in small countries,
experience suggests there are a number of other characteristics in small relative to large countries
relevant to pension policy design.] These include:
*  relative scarcity of human capital specialized in the financial sector;
*  greater international mobility of financial capital;
*  greater gains from international portfolio diversification;
*  proportionately  greater  gross  migration  of  the  labor  force  causing  demographic
instability;
*  greater concentration of wealth and ownership in a small number  of economic agents
(i.e., families) and thus fewer independent interests; and
*  a relatively less independent civil service, and therefore greater reliance on patronage.
3.  When small countries have some or most of these characteristics, pension reforms that have
been carried out in larger Latin American countries such as Chile and  Argentina, which  involve
adoption of mandatory defined contribution schemes with minimum pension guarantees, may not be
/  The characteristics  noted below are indicative  and can also apply in large countries. Moreover, some of these
characteristics  will not be prevalent  in small  countries;  however,  many small  developing  countries  feature  a large  number
of these  stylized  characteristics.  aside from a small  contribution  base.- vi  -
directly applicable.  Similarly, government-operated pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension systems
may be more difficult to adopt successfully in small countries, particularly those characterized by a
high  level of demographic instability and  reliance on patronage.  These  factors can contribute to
arbitrary  redistribution  of  income, threaten  the  financial  viability  of  the  pension  system,  and
undermine  the  confidence  of  contributors.  Under  these  circumstances, policymakers  in  small
countries are in need of a framework to assess options for pension reform, and are increasingly asking
international institutions such as the World Bank to provide guidance in designing of such reforms.
B.  Objective
4.  The objective of this paper is to provide a framework to assess the proper role of the private
sector and the state in providing pension services in small developing countries.  The framework is
based  on  pension economics  and  industrial  organization  theory.  The paper  provides  a  set  of
economic criteria, as well as a checklist of issues for officials of small developing countries and Bank
staff, that need to be investigated to determine the advantages and disadvantages of specific pension
reform options for such countries.
C.  Conclusions and Recommendations
5.  The specific structural characteristics present in small developing countries have important
implications for pension policy and for the advantages of specific reform options.  The preferred
solutions are different than for large and medium-sized countries.  The paper demonstrates that this
result  holds  even  if  the  only  difference  between  small  and  large  countries  is  the  number  of
contributors to the pension system.
6.  Perhaps the most robust overall policy implication of this paper is that in small countries the
case for opening the economy to permit greater trade in financial services is much stronger than  in
large countries.  This is so because:
(a)  The infrastructure needed to support pension services can be radically reduced by
importing key services, which will allow the small country to rely on the financial
supervision, financial sector laws, and, in the extreme, even the civil law framework
of  larger,  more  developed  trading  partners  (see  discussion  of  institutional
infrastructure to support pension services, below);
(b)  The  relatively greater tendency  for  lack of  competition  in the  provision  of  key
pension services in small countries, due to the small contribution base and lack of
independent  interests,  can  be  mitigated  through  greater  international  trade  in
provision of these services (e.g., data processing, investment management, longevity
insurance), combined with actions to mandate the unbundling of collection services
from other pension services (see discussion of supply of pension services, below);
(c)  In small countries this  free trade  in  financial services must  apply  generally and
should enable residents to contract for provision of investments in foreign currencies,
implying the need for explicit convertibility guarantees over very long time horizons.
This  issue  is shown to  matter more  for  small than  for  large  countries  because- vii  -
individuals  demanding  pension  services  will be able to obtain  more diversification  if
they are allowed  to operate  internationally;  and
(d)  Finally, in many small countries  securities markets are not liquid and are often
characterized  by a lack of  independent  interests. The paper suggests  that it may
even be necessary  to mandate  offshore  investments  in addition  to permnitting  greater
foreign  competition  in the provision  of investment  management  services.
7.  From the perspective  of World  Bank policy  advice and actions,  four  key implications  emerge
from  ithis  study:
(a)  The need to encourage  small open economies  with a small base of contributors  to
permit much  greater  international  competition  in pension  services,  which implies  that
establishment  of a multi-pillar  pension system (see James et al., 1994) may not
always  be advisable.
(b)  The need to encourage  much greater harmonization  in certain key regulations  and
coordinated  supervision  across countries  to facilitate  greater cross-border  provision
of pension  services.
(c)  The need to evaluate how World Bank financial products such as convertibility
guarantees might be  used to  permit development  of  more diversified pension
products involving investments in multi-currency  portfolios, for demanders of
pension services. Such guarantees  are needed given  that authorities  would need to
commit to unrestricted  convertibility  of pension incomes into domestic currency
without  exchange  or capital  controls.
(d)  The need to carefully  analyze  the links between  the design of pension  reforms and
the form of prudential  regulatory  or other legal/regulatory  reform being  advocated.
For example,  minimum  capital regulations  for investment  management  companies
may not create  significant  fixed  costs to new entrants  if collection  of contributions  is
vertically  disintegrated  and processing  services  are subcontracted.  This result holds,
because such  a  pension reform design,  involving vertical disintegration of
collections, would imply the need for less initial capital by prospective  entrants
offering  investment  management  services.
8.  The more specific  conclusions  and recommendations  of the paper  can be summarized  under
four categories: institutional  infrastructure  to support pension  services,  supply of pension services,
demrand  for pension  services,  and other  considerations  in pension  policy  and reform.
1. Institutional  Infrastructure  to Support  Pension  Services
9.  The preconditions for  the institutional infrastructure needed in small  countries to permit
partial  or  total privatization  of pension services are no greater and can even be less than those
required in large countries. Some important  types of infrastructure  can be imported  by permitting
freer  trade in international  financial  services,  including:  custody services,  offshore  markets  in which
to invest  in local or foreign  currency-denominated  securities,  and account  processing  services. Some
services,  such as registries  of contributors  and pensioners,  are far more difficult  to import,  but other- viii  -
services, such as supervision, can be "imported" if investment management services are contracted to
foreign firms.
10.  Institutional infrastructure and capacities needed within government agencies, e.g,  domestic
infrastructure to support a domestic securities market, and accounting, auditing, and actuarial or
valuation services, are shown to be highly dependent on  the exact type ofpension  reform proposed
and not only upon permitting international competition. For example, it may not be advisable, or may
even be damaging in poor small countries, to have a "three pillar approach," as advocated in a recent
World Bank study  (1994), which can  involve a-pay-as-you-go first pillar,  a mandatory  defined-
contribution second pillar, and a voluntary occupational plan third pillar.  This is especially true if the
small country has no infrastructure to enforce a tax transfer system, cannot conduct effective financial
supervision, and does not have proper registries of contributors or pensioners.  By contrast, pension
systems that do not entail any mandatory contributions and involve freedom to contract with offshore
providers of pension services imply far fewer infrastructure needs.
2.  Supply of Pension Services
11.  A number of important policy recommendations relating specifically to the supply of pension
services,  including  trustee  services,  involve  establishment  of  a  fiduciary  obligation  between
contributors and  pension plan trustees designated by the government.  Among the most important
findings in this area are:
(a)  There is a need to ensure a reduction of concentration in the trustee function  by
considering  the mandated unbundling of some pension services such as collection
and payment services, while permitting international competition in the provision of
other services, e.g., investment management and insurance.  This recommendation
results because permitting vertical integration back to the point of collections in small
countries can increase overall costs  in the pension industry and result in a much
smaller  number of trustees and  investment management entities, thereby creating
incentives  for  collusion,  particularly  in  small  countries  that  lack  independent
interests.
(b)  Small countries  with a lack of independent interests need  to give attention to  the
number  of  trustees; how they are selected; and  the supervisory, regulatory, and
governance environment in which they operate.  The limited number of independent
interests in some small developing countries demands that the number of trustees be
at  least  six  and  that  coordination  among  trustees  be  prohibited  unless  foreign
investments are very  large.  In addition, this report shows that  in small countries
where  human  capital  is scarce it may  be  best to  permit  individual members of
pension funds to choose the pension management trustee and board of directors, as
opposed to having trustees selected by the government or by employers and unions.
The  latter alternatives are shown to  be fraught with problems  in small countries.
Such a recommendation presumes that regulations and supervision systems are put in
place to  ensure that the  pension fund trustees have  incentives to  carry out their
fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of fund members.
(c)  Providers  of pension  services need the flexibility  to subcontract  domestically  or
internationally for  many pension services.  This should include subcontracting for
data gathering, to permit the small country to acquire pension services at  lowest- ix  -
labor costs and to benefit from the transfer  of know-how. Such concerns  are far
more critical in small than large countries,  because  the economies of scale in such
services  and associated cost reduction  will be difficult to achieve given the small
universe of eligible labor. Permitting international subcontracting of pension
account administration  and processing  is also critical for companies operating in
small countries  to realize efficiencies. A key issue regarding the latter is the cost
of transferring  the information  to the international  processing company,  which in
turn  depends  upon  the  degree  of  competition  in  the  international
telecommunications  industry.
(d)  Regulations applied to portfolio  management in small  countries should permit  or
even mandate that some proportion of the pension funds  be invested in appropriately
rated offshore  securities. This requirement  permits  international  diversification.  It is
also critical in small countries that do not have a  sufficient set of independent
interests,  in order to minimize  the possibilities  for manipulation  of local securities
markets -- a  problem that often arises in small countries as funds become large
relative to the overall size of the domestic securities markets.  This investment
regulation  should be coupled with actions  to permit free entry to foreign  portfolio
management  firms via direct provision  of cross-border  services  without  establishing
a physical presence.  Such policies, in combination,  could make the investment
management  industry  in the small  countries  more  contestable.
(e)  Mandatory provision of insurance services bundled together with pensions (such as
disability coverage or longevity insurance via the purchase of annuities) may not be
advisable  in small countries.  For example,  in a small  country  the demands  on scarce
human capital needed to set up medical boards would be  lessened if disability
coverage  were not made  mandatory.  Voluntary  disability  coverage  may be offered  to
employer-established  groups  of employees  by on and off-shore  insurance  companies
or even by efficient public agencies (in other countries),  which could compete  to
offer such coverage. Also in small  countries,  with fewer persons  covered,  the law of
large  numbers may not apply,  and mortality  tables may be less reliable because  of
the greater  mobility  of labor. Thus, cross-border  provision  and direct investment  by
foreign  insurance  carriers, including  the purchase  of reinsurance  or annuities  in the
international markets, should be  permitted subject to  appropriate regulatory
certification  requirements  by home  and foreign  supervisors.
(f)  The relatively small size of the market for  pension services in small countries,  in
terms of both number of active contributors and level of wages, will limit the interest
offoreign  direct investors in providing such services.  The paper shows that in the
case of markets  with 200,000  to 400,000  active  contributors  and wage rates  of about
US$ 200 to 400 per month (e.g., Bolivia)  the flow of commission  income into the
entire pension provision business  will be between  US$ 2 and US$ 10 million per
year, depending  on the commission  rate. In this case the desire of major foreign
companies  to directly invest  in setting  up a branch  or agency, and to form strategic
alliances with domestic companies,  will be limited.  This implies an additional
argument  for mandating  the unbundling  of pension  services -- i.e., the small size of
these markets could be less of an impediment  to entry if some services,  such as
investment  management,  were less subject  to high fixed  costs upon  entry.3.  Demand for Pension Services
12.  In the case of policy relating to the demand for pension services, differences  between the
small and  large country case are not quite as dramatic as in the case of supply.  Three substantive
conclusions emerge:
(a)  It  is  important  to  avoid  regulations  that  make  demand for  pension  services
insensitive to prices  by prohibiting  differential pricing  of pension services.  Such
regulations discourage price  as opposed to nonprice competition.  Although this
type of problem arises irrespective of country size, it can be exacerbated  in small
countries  where  there  is  greater  labor  mobility.  Liberalization  of  commission
structures can help reduce the nonprice competition and high commercialization of
selling costs often associated with private provision of pension services.  Instead of
needing to send salespeople to sway individuals to move from one pension provider
to another, firms could then engage in greater price competition, which would reduce
costs for all participants.
(b)  Relative  to  large countries,  where some  diversification can  be  obtained  through
domestic investments, in small countries the need for  diversification, coupled with
people's  need to obtain a "real" pension,  implies that authorities should commit to
unrestricted convertibility  of pension  incomes into domestic  currency,  devoid  of
exchange  or  capital  controls.  Multilateral  institutions  could  provide  transitory
guarantees  associated with  convertibility risk  to  ensure  that  a  pension  product
denominated  in  key  international reserve  currencies (e.g.,  U.S.  dollars,  German
marks, and yen) can emerge.  Capital controls can also impede the development of
such pension products, but this risk is more difficult to insure.
(c)  The set  of  annuity products  available  to persons  reaching retirement  in small
countries should concentrate to a much greater degree than in large countries on
variable  rate  annuities.  Such  annuities  permit  pensioners  to  take  on  some
investment risk to partially diversify inflation risk, which is particularly important --
and  difficult --  in small  countries.  This result obtains  because  actual  domestic
inflation in the small country can differ from inflation in the countries where some of
the pension fund is invested, even if the same currency is used.  This risk cannot be
completely diversified, so that in small countries variable rate annuities at retirement
may  be  much  cheaper  than  constant  real  annuities  (i.e.,  index-linked  annuities
defined in terms of the local price index).
4. Other  Considerations  for Pension  Policy and Reform
13.  When a small contribution base in small countries is combined with other characteristics such
as relatively greater gross migration flows, more mobile capital, a lack of independent interests, and a
shortage of  human capital, a number of insights emerge for policymaking. These include:
(a)  Pension policies involving the use offiscal  incentives (e.g 401K plans, IRA accounts,
and tax incentives for  personal  occupational pension plans)  are less attractive in- xi  -
small countries. Commonly  used  tax handles  that are simple  enough to avoid costly
tax administration  arrangements,  such as value added  taxes or import  tariffs,  are not
effective in countering  the improvidence  of workers -- a key objective  of pension
policy. The relatively  greater capital and labor mobility  in small, open developing
countries  means  that the tax base for imposing  a given  fiscal incentive  will be less
broad,  so that such incentives  will be less likely  to stimulate  saving and insurance  for
old age.
(b)  Mandating contributions in exchange  for  rights to benefits, as opposed to schemes
involving fiscal  incentives, carries potentially greater political  risks than in large
countries. However,  such schemes  do address  the problem  of improvident  workers,
as well as failures  in intertemporal  insurance  markets,  more  directly.  To mitigate  the
greater political  risks  in small  countries, mandated  contributions  should  involve:  4)  a
defined contribution  approach to risk sharing between the beneficiaries  and the
government; (ii)  constitutional protection of  property rights associated with
individualized  pension  fund accounts; and (iii) professional  or technical panels to
provide  oversight,  under strict  governance  processes.
(c)  Apparent  funding  (i.e., the  degree  to  which pension  obligations are  backed  by
various forms of securities, inclusive of government securities, is very important in
small countries whereas ultimate funding  (ie.,  backing with outside assets such as
physical orforeign assets) is less critical than in the large country case. This finding
results because  in small  countries  overall economic  growth  is far more dependent  on
openness to  international  trade in  goods, services, factors of  production, and
technology than on  domestic accumulation of  savings and  new  knowledge.
Therefore,  the increase  in domestic  savings  that a pension reform may promote by
insisting on ultimate funding is likely to be relatively less important in a small
country  with open borders. However,  moving  to a system with apparent  funding is
critical because the ability to  back pension promises with securities (even if
government  securities),  as opposed  to legislated  promises,  as in a typical  pay-as-you-
go system, reduces political risks.  In addition, a shift to apparent funding is a
prerequisite  for international  portfolio  diversification,  which is valuable  for smaller
countries  for  the reasons  explained  above.I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Throughout the world, countries of all sizes face difficult decisions in the area of old-age
security.  This  paper  is focused  upon  the  many small  countries that  are  now  in  the  process  of
reforming their social security systems and that confront special pension policy problems related to
their size. At the same time, international institutions such as the World Bank are increasingly being
asked to provide guidance in the design of such reforms.
2.  The objective of this paper is to provide a framework for assessing the proper role of the
private sector and the state in pension policy, which is based on pension economics and industrial
organization theory, but emphasizes aspects of specific relevance to small countries. Thus, the paper
provides guidance to officials  in small developing countries and  Bank staff in the design of policy
frameworks for pension reform in small countries.
3.  Small countries are characterized by  smaller numbers of members  in the pension system,
which result in a  less than  minimum efficient scale in provision of some pension services.  In this
paper, small countries are defined to be those where employment in the formal sector is below one
million.  This assumption alone leads to a number of important policy implications; one of the most
important being the need to subject small countries to greater"international competition"' in provision
of pension services.  In addition, many small countries can also exhibit much greater international
mobilty of labor and capital; are subject to a greater scarcity of human capital specialized in financial
supervision and tax administration; and have far fewer independent financial and political interests,
relatively less  independent civil  services, and  less political stability  over the  long time  horizons
involved in mandatory pension systems.
4.  Perhaps the most robust overall policy implication of this paper is that in small countries, the
case for opening the economy to permit greater trade in financial services is much stronger than in
large countries. This is so because:
(a)  The  infrastructure  needed to  support  pension services  can  be radically  reduced  by
importing  key  services, which will allow the  small  country  to  rely on  the  financial
supervision, financial sector laws, and, in the extreme, even the civil law framework of
larger, more developed trading partners (see discussion of institutional infra-structure to
support pension services, below);
(b)  The relatively greater tendency for lack of competition in the provision of key pension
services in small countries, due to the small contribution base and lack of independent
interests, can  be  mitigated  through greater  international  trade  in  provision  of these
services (e.g., data processing, investment management, longevity insurance), combined
with actions to mandate the unbundling of collection services from other pension services
(see discussion of supply of pension services, below);
(c)  In small countries this free trade in financial services must apply generally and should
enable residents to contract for provision of investments in foreign currencies, implying
the need for explicit convertibility guarantees over very long time horizons. This issue is
shown to matter more for small than for large countries because individuals demanding- 2  -
pension services will be able to obtain more diversification if they are allowed to operate
internationally; and
(d)  Finally,  in  many  small  countries  securities  markets  are  not  liquid  and  are  often
characterized by a lack of  independent interests. The paper suggests that it may even be
necessary  to mandate  offshore  investments in addition to  permitting  greater  foreign
competition in the,provision of investment management services.
5.  This  paper  develops  a  detailed  framework,  based  largely  on  industrial  organization
economics, to evaluate the need for special regulations of supply and demand for pension services in
small countries.  The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the primary pension services
and explains the  links between the costs of pension services and development  of certain types of
infrastructure within the small country context.  In addition, it shows how the design  of pension
reforms have implications for the type of infrastructure needed to support a mandated pension system.
Section III covers the  supply of trustee  services, and the organization of supply of other pension
services including investment portfolio  management.  Section IV  discusses  some of the  special
demand  problems of a  small  country.  Section V  outlines a number of other  issues that arise  in
designing pension policy in small countries that are characterized by not only a  small contribution
base, but also by greater international capital and labor mobility, less human capital, and a number of
other  stylized  characteristics.  Finally,  Section  VI  offers  some  provisos  and  summarizes  the
recommendations.
H.  PENSION SERVICES  AND INSTITUTIONAL  I1FRASTRUCTURE
A.  Primary Pension Services
6.  Pension provision comprises the  following services:  (a) contribution  collection, wherein
employers acting as retention agents are contacted periodically by a collection agency that receives
payment  and  raw  data  about  each  worker's  contributions; (b)  data  processing  of  contribution
information, with processing oriented to eliminating errors from the raw data; (c) accounting support
to mark investments to market prices, to calculate net asset value for each fund on a daily or weekly
basis, and  to  ensure that  investment diversification guidelines and  other  regulations  are met;  (d)
bringing together the information generated in the previous steps and processing individual accounts
to obtain new balances; (e) client services provided to the contributors and  pensioners (members),
such as sending of account statements and answering inquiries; (f) portfolio management, including
analysis of investment opportunities and financial risk management; (g) insurance and related benefit
management, including benefit calculation and purchase of disability, survivorship, and  longevity
insurance (in the form of annuities); (h) pension payments and distribution of lump sum payments to
permit  purchase of annuities;  and  (i) processing transfers  of individual account  balances  among
authorized pension management trustees.-3-
B.  Institutional Infrastructure and Costs of Primary Pension Services
7.  The costs of providing each of these  primary pension services are not independent of the
infrastnrcture  present  in a  specific country  (see  Annex  for  details). For  example,  inadequately
functioning registries, i.e., contributor and employer identification systems, can make imposition of a
mandatory  contribution system based on  individualized accounts significantly more costly,  if not
imposs'ible, to implement. In the case of Peru, the new pension system was forced to create its own
identification numbers for members. A high cost could not be avoided even though procedures were
coordinated by the Peruvian Superintendency of Pensions. These numbers are now  being used by
other services not related to pensions.
8.  Cost-effective  provision  of  pension  services  also  requires  the  existence  of  a  basic
infrastiucture in the areas of clearing and settlement of payments and custody of securities, which are
often  not well  developed in small countries (see  Annex).  The financial  information needed  for
efficient  provision  of  insurance  and  fund  management  services  requires  actuarial,  auditing,
accourting,  valuation, and securities rating services, some of which can be imported.  Finally, there
needs to an  adequate supervisory and legal/regulatory framework, which may be more difficult to
import.
9.  Although the institutional infrastructure required to support a low-cost pension system may
appear daunting, the minimum local requirements are well within the capability of small countries,
particularly if reforms are implemented to permit free importation of a large number of the services
noted (see Annex).  Evidence from some Central American countries suggests that this  is already
occurring in the case of a number of services (see Box 1).
Box 1. Leasing Institutional Infrastructure from Abroad
Examples  of  institutional  infrastructure  that  can  be  imported  include,  in  the  case  of Costa  Rica,  subcontracting
the processing  of services  to price  and  trade  different  kinds  of securities  (government  or private)  through
Chile's  electronic  stock  exchange.  Given  the  small  volume  of  transactions  generated  in  the  country,  acquiring
all  the necessary  infrastructure  (hardware,  software,  etc.)  and  human  capital  to develop  the securities  market
was very  costly;  therefore,  subcontracting  the services  abroad  allowed  the  Costa  Ricans  to trade  in the
securities  market  without  the need  to  make  these  investments.
A minimum  set  of infrastructure  however,  must  be developed  domestically.  This  should  include:  (a)  a system
that  identifies  contributors,  pensioners,  and  employers;  (b)  an adequate  system  of banking;  and  (c) pension
supervision  sufficient  to enforce  the pension  regulatory  framework.  Of  these  three  areas,  the  development  of
an adequate  pension  supervision  system  is the most  difficult  to implement  given  the shortage  of specialized
human  capital  in  small  developing  countries  (but  see  Box  2). Many  other  services  (e.g.,  information  services)
can  be imported  or will  develop  effectively  if  the  supervisozy  and  regulatory  framework  creates  incentives  for
self-regulatory  associations  to  set  high  minimum  standards  for  the  services  provided  by  their  members.
10.  In addition, even when some infrastructure services need to be provided locally, the human
capital and overall costs for small countries may not be as great as anticipated. For example, Box 2
suggests  that  even  in  medium-sized countries  such  as  Chile,  the  costs  of  developing  pension
supervision capacity are not prohibitive.-4-
Box 2.  Chilean Superintendency of AFP
Sometimes  the amount  of human capital  required  by a Superintendency  is overstated.  In Chile,  the
Superintendency  of Pension  Fund  Management  Companies  had 79 employees  with  at least 4 years of
university  study  in 1994. The composition  was  as follows:
Accountants/auditors  26  Statisticians  3
Economists  . 21  Industrial  engineers  3
Computer  engineers  9  Sociologists  I
Lawyers  8  Medical  doctors  I
Social  workers  6  Other  I
C.  Pension Reform Design and Institutional Infrastructure
11.  The extent of institutional infrastructure needed to support a pension system depends on the
specific design  adopted.  For example,  a  mandatory  occupational pension  scheme  like  that  in
Switzerland, which places the burden of pension management on the employer, avoids the collection
stage so the associated infrastructure is not needed.  However, duplication of accounts and account
transfer  can  be  very  costly  in that  setting, because there  may  be tens  of thousands  of pension
managers.  Similarly, a pension design wherein the government is the sole issuer of securities that can
be bought by a  fully funded scheme does not require much of the  infrastructure associated with
domestic  securities  markets,  such  as  valuation  and  risk  rating  services  or  complex  laws  and
regulations relating to conflicts of interest and corporate governance.  Finally, to the extent that the
management of a large portion of pension funds is contracted out to a single major intemational fund
management firm, and domestic investment by the pension funds is limited, there is less need for
extensive supervision and infrastructure of the domestic securities market.
12.  Another type of pension reform option that can vastly reduce the infrastructure needed is one
where the role of the government would only be to mandate contributions, create a collection system,
set certain minimum standards for a pension contract, and license international companies to offer that
contract to  local contributors.  In other words, leave it to  Merrill Lynch.  in this case  the  small
developing country is de facto importing supervision services, and avoiding all of the infrastructure
needed for domestic securities markets except for registries to identify contributors and pensioners.
In a less extreme case, some proportion of the assets could be invested in domestic financial markets.
Although this  option can reduce the infrastructure needed,  it introduces other  risks and costs  to
pensioners.  For example, under this setup each contributor could switch to a different international
pension fund manager  once a year.  This would mean  that each worker could have 47  different
suppliers through retirement.  The cumulative costs of administering each pension would increase
with each change.  In addition, legal recourse by pensioners under  laws in the country where  the
foreign investment management firm is domiciled would need to be carefully analyzed.
13.  The effectiveness of some types of institutional infrastructure is also a function of the specific
forms of infrastructure that can be provided "together in one bundle."  For example, if the pension
supervisory body performs some operating functions, as it does in Peru, it loses some of the authority
and incentives needed for effective supervision of that function. This is because the administrators of
such a supervisory body are subject to a conflict of interest, since many of them may find it difficult
to criticize their own performance. In addition, a supervisory authority in that role becomes hostage to
its own personnel, since there is no alternate supplier of the operating functions it has centralized and
nationalized. There is also a loss of information about the efficiency with which those functions could-5-
be  performed  elsewhere,  which  may  further  hamper the  cost-effectiveness  of  nationalizing the
provision of certain infrastructure services.
III.  THE SUPPLY OF PENSION SERVICES
14.  In small countries, relatively more attention should be paid to designing pension systems that
ensure  adequate competition, or,  more formally, contestability, in provision  of pension services.
Because  small countries  often  experience greater  labor mobility  than  large  countries, their total
mandatory contribution rates are subject to a lower ceiling, as discussed elsewhere in this report.  In
this  setting, an  increase  in  administrative  charges  cannot  be  absorbed  by  increasing the  total
contribution  rate, as it could be in larger countries; rather, the net  contribution rate and the final
average replacement rate must be reduced. This means that the effectiveness of the tool of mandating
contributions is damaged to a greater extent in a small country, because very low replacement rates do
not help,  improvident workers enough.
A.  Conceptual Framework
15.  As Baumol et  al. (1982)  note, contestability is a characteristic of  many markets. This  is
particularly  true  in the  production of  financial services (Braeutigam,  1989; Gorton,  1989). The
industrial structure of a market will not be contestable -- entry will be blocked -- if it is characterized
by  both sunk costs  and subadditive  costs over the relevant range of output; that  is, by  a natural
monopoly.  If  both sunk  costs  and subadditivity of costs are significant, they  will  permit initial
industry participants that earn extra-normal profits to deter entry.  However, if sunk costs  are not
significant, removal of entry controls, if present, may be sufficient to make provision of a good or
service contestable even if the industry is a natural monopoly.
16.  Sunk costs arise when there are capital costs associated with production of a good or service
for a given client that cannot be recovered for the use of other clients. An example in the context of
pension services is the  information capital built up to manage collections at  minimum cost, which
involves detailed knowledge of particular employers present in a given area.  Another example is the
advertising costs of a pension fund management firm or insurance company.
17.  If  one  particular  pension  service  is not  contestable, and  that  service is  not  subject to
substitution in the total bundle of pension services, and all the other services in the bundle are offered
in perfect competition, then, in theory, the monopoly supplier could extract similar monopoly rents,
either by overpricing its monopoly service or by vertically integrating to offer the entire bundle of
services and overpricing  the bundle  (Warren-Boulton, 1974; Tirole,  1988). In practice, the other
services in the bundle are unlikely to be offered in perfect competition, especially trustee services, so
in most cases a monopoly supplier gains by integrating and providing the entire bundle.  Even if some
diseconomies of vertical integration appear, the level of commission income will still increase due to
vertical integration.
18.  Such an analysis suggests that legislating the unbundling of the pension services in which
there is a natural monopoly and  sunk costs may facilitate entry  into the other markets for pension
services. A  reduction  in  concentration  associated with  this  mandatory  disintegration  is socially-6-
valuable for a nonstandard reason: atomistic trustees have less political power. Concentration creates
a special type of externality, since an increase in the market share of the largest trustees reduces the
quality of service offered by other providers. This is because an increase in overall concentration of
trustees increases the political risk of all pensions offered by a mandatory  system. Because of this
externality, interventions that limit concentration in the trustee market may be justified.
19.  This argument should not be confused with the conventional one that concentration leads to
an increase in charges and fees. Experience and theory show that prices may fall or increase with
concentration, depending on market conditions. For example, a firm may be stronger (more efficient)
in operations than its rivals or may have a lower profitability goal. If such a firm gains market share,
average commissions may fall.
20.  In  addition,  disintegration  also  facilitates  regulation  of  the  pension  services  in  which
there  is  a  natural  monopoly.  More  efficient  regulation  may  generate  an  additional  fall  in
charges.  For  such services, the  alternatives  are  competitive bidding  for  the  right  to  operate  a
franchise (Demsetz, 1968), price regulation, and self-regulation.
21.  Lack of contestability is not always due to natural monopoly and sunk costs. Entry may also
be blocked by legal barriers (legislation). One of the most common legal barriers found  in small
countries is the prohibition against cross-border provision of services.  It follows that an effective
strategy to prevent small market size from generating a monopoly is to allow the buyer to obtain the
service from an offshore provider. In many cases, this strategy must not only eliminate prohibitions,
but must also reduce special taxes on cross-border provision and dismantle nontariff barriers such as
nonacceptance of foreign formats for the services involved.
22.  International trade  of  pension services  in  small countries  also  depends  critically  on the
availability and prices of enabling infrastructure, particularly in the areas of telecommunications and
computers.  Lack  of competition  in  these  services can  greatly  increase  the  cost  of cross-border
provision of pension services (see Annex).
B. Supply of Trustee Services
23.  A key issue in small countries relates to the supply of trustee services and governance.  A
good way of analyzing the pension service industry is by distinguishing between services rendered to
stocks  and  services  rendered  to  flows.  Services  to  flows  include  collection  of  contributions,
processing of individual accounts, and payments of pensions. The services rendered to stocks include
pension fund management, custody, and transaction execution. The distinction is useful because the
consequences of a concentration of supply are different for each of these types of services.
24.  Concentration and market power in processing accounts may result in large fees, but the fees
are unlikely to be large enough to erode the pension funds significantly. However, concentration in
pension fund management brings the  prospect of fiduciary  fraud, and  more  importantly, allows
financial power to be concentrated in a few hands.  This in turn may induce politicians to attempt to
gain access to that financial power and exploit it for their own purposes.
25.  Large  administrative  fees  are  unlikely to  be  sufficient  to  diminish  the  pension  funds
significantly, because in typical cases close to 70 percent of a pension is financed by past and future-7-
interest earned, and only 30 percent is a recouping of contributions (with no interest). To understand
the magnitudes involved, consider a case where administrative fees of I percent of wages are added
to  a  contribution  rate of  10 percent, which  yields a  gross pension equal to  70 percent  of gross
earnings. If 4 to 5 percent increase in interest earned requires that administrative fees be increased
from  I to 2 percent of wages, then the combination allows the total contribution rate to be reduced
from 1.  1 to 9.22 percent while keeping the same expected pension 2.
26.  The extent of political risk is a critical issue.  The possibility of political intervention to direct
the use of the pension funds is an important source of financial risk over the long term. This risk tends
to be greatest when the government designates the board(s) of trustees.
1. Functions of Pension Trustees
27.  Efficient investment management distinguishes between portfolio managers, who are experts
in financial  investments, and pension trustees, who  hold residual or prudential oversight  powers.
Trustees are critical in determining financial performance, since they have the power to fire and hire
portfolio  managers and  set guidelines for  their  financial strategy.  In addition,  trustees  are  also
empowered to select auditors that value illiquid assets, and to select custodians. When pension funds
hold equity in corporations, trustees issue voting instructions at shareholders' meetings.
28.  The suggestion that trustees be chosen by impersonal bidding, made by Arrau and Bitran
(1992), is not practical because such bidding would be extremely vulnerable to adverse selection.  In
this context, adverse selection means that some persons would be disproportionately attracted to offer
low  bids, such  as criminals, persons willing to  sell their decisions to  rich business  groups,  and
political administrators willing to use their power to obtain favors and contributions for their own
parties.  Although bidding coupled with adequate screening processes for checking the background
and  qualifications  of trustees  could be employed  in theory, trustees have  never been  chosen  by
bidding in any country.
29.  The critical question is who performs the function of trustee: 3 There are two aspects to the
present question: (i) who designates the board of trustees; and (ii) what is the minimum number of
"independent" boards of trustees needed in the pension system. This should not be confused with the
issues' of how many providers of pension services should be hired and how vertically integrated they
should be, which are discussed in Section IIIC.
2. Independent Boards of Trustees
30.  The number of trustees should be greater than five, because a smaller number would create a
monopoly  or  oligopoly  that  could  control  the  domestic  financial  system  and  the  domestic
corporations, if significant pension fund resources are to be invested domestically and if the portfolio
movements of the pension funds are not to dominate the exchange rate. A mandatory pension system
is expected to accumulate assets that are 200 percent of GNP, if coverage of workers is to be  100
2/  This calculation  assumes  a flat age-earning  profile,  40 years  of continuous  contribution,  and 20 years of retirement.
3./  The so-called "Master Trustee"  is a vertically integrated pension services company that has a misleading  name.  It
integrates all functions except that of sponsor or trustee, which has the final say about investment strategy and voting in
shareholders'  meetings.  Given a board  of trustees,  that board  can  subcontract separately  the portfolio  managers, a
custodian, a collection firm, and an account processing provider.-8-
percent --  two to four times the assets of the banking system of most countries. Sooner or later, an
oligopoly would use its power to attempt to control these assets. However, if the country is willing to
require the pension system to permanently invest at  least 95  percent of its funds in international
capital markets, a single or very few trustees or board of directors could be considered.
31.  Requiring  the  pension  system to  invest a  large  proportion  of  its  assets  internationally,
however, could  be detrimental for the development of the domestic  economy, depending  on  the
degree of international capital mobility.  The option of requiring the pension system to invest in debt
instruments alone eliminates the problems related to voting in shareholders' meetings ofnonfinancial
companies, but it does not justify the existence of a single trustee.  The Swedish experience with the
two AP funds of the ATP system, which followed this option in 1959, shows that the trustees can still
wield enormous financial power by refusing to buy corporate or bank bonds until required covenants
are accepted (Pontusson, 1984).
32.  The only case where a single or a few trustees are feasible is the one of a very small country
that has a very open capital account and that enjoys such high degree of access to foreign capital
markets that even small and medium-sized firms would not become dependent on the single trustee.
These  conditions  are  not  met  in  most  small  developing  countries;  however,  they  are  met  by
municipalities and even state governments in very large countries such as the United States. For all
other cases, there  should be at least six trustees or separate  boards, and coordination among them
should be prohibited, despite the not insignificant difficulties of enforcing such a provision.
33.  Besides  ensuring  a  certain  number of trustees  and  limiting  how  they  are related  across
separate pension funds, the issue of the independence of the trustees is multifaceted. First, they must
be independent from affiliated investment managers to ensure that they are acting in the interests of
pension fund contributors.  Second, independence must also  extend to  their dealings with related
parties within the financial group and with nonfinancial companies, if the pension fund can invest in
equities.  In small  countries, finding independent trustees may  require using foreign  nationals of
sufficient standing, and making them subject to adequate criminal and civil liability if they do not
properly discharge their  fiduciary obligations.  In sum, ensuring  a  certain number  of trustees  or
separate boards of directors is a necessary but not sufficient condition for small countries to obtain the
benefits of private investment management in such areas as corporate governance of nonfinancial
companies.  In many of these countries, independent trustees, or outside directors, must be precisely
defined in law and regulation and be subject to credible enforcement by supervisory agencies.
3. Trustee Selection and Political Risk
34.  There are many ways to designate trustees. One is for the government to designate them at
either the national or regional level.  Another is for employers or unions to be assigned by law to
designate the trustees;  and  the third  is for  individual workers to  choose among  available trustee
services offered by pension management firms.
35.  Selection by individual members. In the option where individual members choose among
competitive and licensed pension management companies, as in Chile, the United Kingdom (since
1988), Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, that licensed company plays the role of trustee.  The members
of the board of the pension management company take on trustee responsibilities, as specified in
fiduciary conventions and specific regulations. These include choosing accountants and custodians,-9-
setting the  overall  investment  strategy, directing the  activities  of  the  portfolio  managers (both
individuals and specialized companies with which it may subcontract); and directing their voting in
shareholders' meetings. The individual members retain the rights to: (a) switch trustees, moving to
another pension management company; and (b) bring suit against the board of directors for breach of
fiduciary duties, either alone or in the context of a class action, where such recourse is permitted by
law.4 This is analogous to the delegation of rights in exchange for taking up fiduciary duties that
occurs in the voluntary mutual.fund or unit trust industry.
36.  To enable this  option, the  state's  role is to provide a  clear body  of  law that defines the
attributes of the fiduciary relationship. Some of these attributes are (a) affirmative duties to disclose,
(b) open-ended duties to act, and  (c) a  promise not to  take implicit compensation unless openly
disclosed (Clark,  1985). A  second role for the state is solid enforcement  by the courts. These two
roles are more difficult to carry out in small than in large countries, because the specialized human
capital needed to operate fiduciary law is more scarce, and the relative lack of independent interests
makes the courts less reliable.
37.  Still, the state can play a role by providing a specialized  superintendency or regulator, which
ensures that the boards of directors of the pension management companies discharge their fiduciary
duties.  In addition, actions can be taken through public disclosure and  reports to the regulator to
credibly enforce independence of the trustee or board member from related parties in the financial
group, nonfinancial companies, or investment managers, as well  as provide insulation from other
conflicts. 5
38.  The law assigns  the duty  to employers  and  unions.  Where the employer or the union is
assigned  by  law  to  be  the  sponsor  that  designates  the  board  of  trustees,  as  in  Australia  and
Switzerland, the danger exists that the members become vulnerable to manipulation by the sponsors.
More formally, there are greater principal agent problems in these arrangements.  The risk that some
of the thousands of trustees created by such a law will fail to fulfill their imposed fiduciary role may
be somewhat mitigated by a solid body of fiduciary law, provided it is well enforced by the courts,
but the task is very demanding. For example, the Goode Report (1993, Section 4, para. 5.54) declares
that "It is unrealistic to imagine that individual  trustees will be able to leave behind entirely their other
roles....  In the  modem  world, conflicts  of  interest cannot  be avoided.  They  can,  however, be
managed." In practice, even though British trustees have the duty "to act impartially, fairly balancing
the interests of different  classes of beneficiary" (Goode Report, Section  4, para. 5.4), most base
benefils on the last annual salary, a practice that redistributes wealth to those of higher income, as
they  normally have  a  steeper age-earnings profile. The most recent  (1992)  scandal of employer
manipulation of pension funds is that involving Robert Maxwell in the United Kingdom.
39.  Australia has attempted to mitigate problems associated with trustee selection by employers
or unions by allowing members to elect half of the board of trustees.  For theU.K., the Goode Report
(Section 4, para.  5.40) proposes allowing members to elect a  third  or two-thirds of the  board of
trustees, depending upon whether the plan  is defined benefit or defined contribution, and only for
plans with more than 50 members.  In fact, many of the elected trustees are union officials who can
also manipulate the pension fund against some classes of members. This has indeed been the case in
4! In many Latin  American  countries  the tradition  of the Napoleonic  code does not allow for bringing  class action  suits.
51  Regulations  may, for example, require records of trading by trustees  or related parties, as well as by investment
managers. Also, regulations can be designed to require certain minimum standards for internal  compliance  by the
pension  fund,  e.g., internal  control systems  to prevent  abuses  by trustees  or board  members.- 10  -
some union-sponsored multiemployer plans, both in the United States 6 and in developing countries.
However, an abundant  legal tradition regarding fiduciary rights and  independent courts  was still
unable to deter fraud in pensions, although some reforms that were passed subsequently may have
improved matters.
40.  Small countries may have even more difficulty relying on court control, due to the lack of
specialized human capital and the limited number of independent interests.  Even in the U.K., the
Goode Report concluded that creating a  pensions regulator was essential, bringing  the option of
employer/union selection closer to the one with individual selection of trustees or boards.  The analog
in the case of member election of the board of trustees would be to entitle the members to elect part of
the board of trustees, as shareholders do in public corporations. However, this remedy is in most cases
less  powerful than the  right to  switch  trustees by  moving to another  pension  fund management
company.
41.  Assignment  by the state.  A last option is where the government designates a single or a set
of regional boards of trustees.  In this case the state intervenes not as supervisor, but as sponsor of the
board of trustees of the pension system, which oversees the adoption of prudential decisions.  In this
option there is no scope for a superintendency, since congressmen or politicians take up the role of
supervising the board of trustees. This option may be marginally improved by applying fiduciary law
to these congressmen and politicians.  The practice of naming trustees for long overlapping periods,
as in Supreme Courts or independent central banks, has been rejected by the Goode Report (Section
4, para. 5.49) because such trustees may impose additional liabilities on the sponsor.
42.  When analyzing  state ownership  of  natural monopolies, Willig (1994)  has  shown that  a
privately  owned  monopoly  subject  to  price  regulation  has  an  important  advantage  over  state
ownership of the same monopoly, because the property rights of owners insulate the private firms
from political influences.  On the other hand, state ownership has the advantage of being able to
respond to a social interest (different from an individual interest), even though the required response
cannot be specified in advance through automatic rules and cannot be verified after the fact.
43.  When applying these principles to the issue of designation of pension fund boards of trustees,
we gain from insulating investment decisions from political influences, since the rate of return is by
far the most  important determinant of benefit levels. On the other hand, nationalization of trustee
designation  involves none of the  gains mentioned by Willig (1994), because  there  is no need  to
respond to a  social interest different from an individual interest, with the  social interest narrowly
defined as striving for secure and substantial pensions for the improvident.  In addition, most trustee
actions needed to achieve that purpose can be specified in advance or can be verified after the fact.
Still, there exist other gains from nationalizing the designation of trustees.  These gains are related to
avoidance of costs that arise naturally with multiple providers of pension services under  the non-
nationalization option.  Specifically, nationalization avoids (a) the marketing costs associated with
individual selection among several pension management trustees, and (b) the potential for breach of
trust by private trustees, whether they are designated by individuals, employers, or unions.  However,
nationalization often increases political risks to contributors because the trustees have little insulation
from political manipulation.
6  See  Res (1985),  who  cites  the famous  case  of  the Teamsters Pension  Fund  for  the  central  states,  southeast  and
southwest areas.  This case is described in more detail in James and James (1965).- 11  -
4. Coimparing  the Options
44.  The  optimal  design  for  the  number  and  selection  method of  trustees,  and  the  related
regulatory  supervisory framework, turns on the  relative size of these costs. The risk of fraud by
employers and unions can increase the risk to pensions significantly, and this risk is higher in smaller
countries due to the smaller number of independent financial interests.  This risk depends in part on
the quality of supervision, but creating an adequate supervisory framework similar to the ERISA law
in the United  States or the BVG law in Switzerland may be impossible for many small developing
countries, which lack the specialized human capital needed to enforce such laws. In addition, to the
extent that these laws create entities such as government guarantee funds (e.g., the Pension Guarantee
Fund  in case of ERISA), experience in small Latin American countries suggests that this  is a very
dangerous policy given the moral hazard problems engendered. 7 The high marketing costs observed
in Chile, Argentina, and Peru are due in part to excessive government regulation of the fee structure.
For example, the marketing costs, which run up to 30 percent of fee income in ChileanAFPs, are only
18 percent of fees in Chilean health insurance companies, which also collect mandatory contributions
but have  free pricing and therefore are free to offer group plans to each member  (Valdes-Prieto,
1995).  Fees could  be even lower  if other  recommendations made  in Section  IIIC are followed,
because entry would be easier.  In any case, an 18 percent  increase in administrative fees may be
worth a reduction in the risk of pensions if the reduction is large enough.
45.  The expected costs of political interference associated with government-designated boards of
trustees  depend  on  the  degree of a  country's  political development.  If the  country  can  create
government-designated boards and associated governance processes that are sufficiently  insulated
from politics and are able to perform their prudential role efficiently, this would be the best option.
However, many small  developing countries are not politically developed enough  for  this  option.
Consider, for example, the case of a military government that could replace the board of trustees with
no opposition.  If a single party has dominated the political spectrum for decades, as in certain Latin
American, Asian, and Eastern European countries, boards of trustees in those countries could not be
insulated from political pressures.  What is more, a small country that depends on  an imperialist
power for more than 80 percent of its international trade may be forced to change its board of trustees
due to pressures from that power.
46.  There  are  many  subtle ways  to  politically  influence  government-designated  boards  of
trustees, which are more prevalent in small countries because of a  smaller number of independent
political interests. If political parties compete mostly on  the basis of promises to their  immediate
followers  (patronage),  or on  the basis  of promising  benefits  for  the  majority  of  current voters
(populism), or if the parties or elected representatives can be bribed easily by pressure groups, then
government-designated boards of trustees have few chances to succeed in their duties over the long
term.  Once a regional or national board of trustees is captured by politicians, it can threaten the fund
managers it hires with nonrenewal of their contracts unless they buy overpriced bonds from private
firms that contribute to the campaigns of those politicians, or risky bonds issued by municipalities
controlled by the dominating party, or bonds that yield below-market rates issued by the treasury or
by state-owned enterprises (Tiglao, 1990); or if they do not buy overpriced mortgage bonds, as was
required to support the official housing policy in Sweden (Pontusson, 1984).
Z/  Even in large countries,  the establishment  of guarantee  funds for occupational  pension plans creates distorted
incentives.12 -
47.  In countries that exhibit this type of political  behavior, a pension system based on competitive
selection of pension management companies by individual members can insulate trustees from many
of  these  pressures.  Since  each  pension management  company  must  compete  for  clients,  this
competitive  process  punishes  those  companies  that  indulge  in  concessions  to  politicians.  For
example, if powerful politicians request that pension management companies buy a low-yielding debt
from a state-owned enterprise, the company resists this pressure will exhibit higher retums and will be
rewarded with more customers and higher profits, as seen in a recent Chilean episode (Godoy and
Valdes-Prieto, 1994).  It is important to note that these benefits will obtain with more certainty if the
supervision agencies help  to support the  political independence of the members of the  boards of
trustees.
48.  Therefore, in all cases where the political development of a small country has not reached a
stage where vulnerability to such pressure can be confidently ruled out, and human capital is too
scarce to  supervise  thousands  of employer and  union-run  boards of trustees, the  best  option  is
individual selection of  pension management companies.  This  proposition has  received empirical
support.  A  recent  study  by  Mitchell and  Hsin (1996)  about  the  financial  performance of  130
occupational pension plans for public employees at the state and county levels in the United States,
where the sponsor is a political entity, finds that the presence of elected pensioner representatives,
usually linked to unions, on the boards of trustees reduces the rate of return of the pension fund.
49.  A recent study  by the World Bank, 8 about the  rate of return obtained by provident funds
(single, government-managed pension funds) in 14 countries, found that all of them performed worse
than privately managed pension fund management companies, and many had returns below negative
ten percent per year for five years. A study by Mesa-Lago (1991) compares the financial returns of
the funds invested by half-funded conventional social security systems in 8 Latin American countries
and comes to similar conclusions.
50.  In light of this experience, small developing countries may wish to choose a design with
privately owned  competing  pension trustee companies,  supervised  by  a  specialized  government
agency -- a superintendency.  (The exceptions, where other trustee arrangements might be better,
would be countries that have enough human capital to supervise tens of thousands of employers and
unions, and have a high degree of political development and stability.)  However, the arrangement
with  privately owned  competing pension trustee companies  may  be rendered suboptimal  if  this
market turns out to be concentrated.  This is because a tight oligopoly of pension trustee companies
would have too much power in the domestic securities markets, where international capital mobility is
not significant, thus increasing the risk that these firms would be misused by politicians.  Section C
below discusses  the possibility that concentration in some types  of financial services rendered to
flows (e.g., collections, payments of benefits) may lead to concentration in the pension trustee market
(i.e., services applied to stocks).
C.  Competition in the Supply of Some Pension Services
51.  The paragraphs that follow assess the degree to which each pension service is characterized
by monopoly.  In each case, specific options are described for the provision of that service.
!I See  James  et at.  (1994),  Chapter  3. paras.  93-6  and  Figure  3.7  and  Chapter  6, Fig.  6.3.- 13 -
1. Collection and Processing of Contributions
52.  Economies of scope.  The collection process is characterized by economies of scope, which
come from three sources.  First, each employer has to fill out a form for each provider of collection
services, with each form indicating the employees within the company who  have chosen pension
management companies that in tum have hired a particular collections provider.  There is a fixed cost
involved in completing these forms.  Therefore, a collection service serving pension companies that
represent a  larger share of the workers can spread that fixed cost  over that  larger number.  The
differential between the average cost of collection for large a versus small number of workers per
form favors a particular organization of supply: a single provider of collection services per employer.
This organization minimizes the number of forms per employer.
53.  Second, the cost  borne by the employer clearly falls as the number of collection agencies
falls, because many assignment errors are avoided and the remaining mistakes can be corrected at a
smaller cost. The cost of correcting mistakes when the employer distributes 60 employees among 6
forms is much larger than the cost when all 60 employees are on a single form. This means that
employers  also  favor an  organization  of  supply of pension services  in which  there  is a  single
collection agent.
54.  In a  competitive environment, these two  sources of economies  of scope  do not  imply a
natural  monopoly in  collection,  because many collector firms can  compete  to  act  as  the single
collection agent for any given employer. However, in a regulatory setting in which employers are not
allowed to express their preference for a single collector, and where collectors  are not allowed to
express the lower costs of collecting all the contributions paid by a given employer, these economies
of scope cannot be expressed in prices. This is precisely what happens  in Chile, where regulations
prevent both types of response.  Employers are not allowed to choose one  collector because  it is
believed that the employer would obtain help to evade the obligation to contribute. This, in fact,
seerns to have happened as well in the Mexican retirement savings account system (SAR) set up in
Mexico during 1992-1994.
55.  This restriction does not yet imply a natural monopoly, however, because the other side of the
market, namely collectors, would be willing to compete by offering discounts to groups of workers
employed  by  a  single  employer.  In  the  absence  of  price  regulations,  a  small  pension  fund
management company could start life with just  a dozen contracts with ten or twenty mediumsized
empiloyee  groups that pass on to their members the savings from acting in a group, and enjoy very
small collection costs. No natural monopoly, therefore, would originate in scope economies.
56.  The restriction in Chile is that collectors are banned by law from offering discounts.  Since
the cost savings remain but are not expressed in discounts, they benefit the collectors that come closer
to acting as single collector for  each employer. The pension management companies with a larger
share in the worker market, assuming that those workers are evenly distributed across employers,
enjoy a lower average collection cost per worker. This type of "economy from larger market share" is
due largely to the regulations that prevent employers and collectors from expressing their savings in
lower prices.
57.  It is important to discuss whether allowing discounts for worker groups employed by a single
employer is a good  idea. It  is possible to  imagine that an employer would offer incentives to its- 14 -
workers to choose a particular pension management company in order to save on administrative costs,
and  that  the employer's influence could  be tainted  by  a conflict of  interest. This  danger  can be
managed  by  imposing on  employers  an obligation  not to  influence their  employees  to  favor a
particular pension management company, but allowing them to encourage the selection of a  single
pension management company.
58.  A third and final type of economy of scope may be realized through the consolidation of the
forms  used by employers to  pay taxes,  pension contributions, unemployment  insurance, workers
compensation, and mandatory health insurance into a single form, or at least into a unique collection
process.  However, diseconomies of scope  may also exist  in this  approach because a  mistake in
processing one service may affect the others. In any case, this source of economies does not favor
concentration of supply per se, but rather a larger scope of the service.
59.  Fixed and sunk costs.  Collection services also exhibit costs that are both fixed and sunk.
This is because collection of contributions is a specialized activity quite different from, say, banking.
The design of operations in countries where few employers use computers must deal with the fact that
5 to 10 percent of the raw data (incoming forms) contain errors, a much higher error rate than the one
that banks can manage at low cost. The contribution processing system should detect and directly
solve some of these errors and allow for consultation with employers to reconcile the rest.  In this
setting, specialization pays off handsomely.
60.  A  specialized processing  system  can take  advantage of  the  fact  that  the  error  can  be
reconciled within a few months without major damage, which is not true of banking.  In large Chilean
pension management companies, a major part of the error reconciliation and correction occurs later
on, in the massive processing stage. Further specialization gains can be made by building a network
of contacts with the subset of employers that use computers, to connect to their accounting systems.
There are large savings from moving collection offices out of expensive financial districts into areas
with lower rentals, and from designing the tasks to be able to employ inexpensive personnel (avoiding
the complex training needed by bank clerks, who must master a much larger variety of tasks).  This
know-how may reduce collection costs per form to less than one-third of the collection costs of a
commercial bank.
61.  Specialized  collection technology  exhibits two  properties:  First,  most  of the  specialized
know-how needed to reduce average costs is lost upon exit.  This means that this is a sunk cost, the
first condition for a  natural monopoly.  Second, there  are economies of  scale  in developing the
specialized know-how needed to reduce average costs.  An investment in specialized error correction
procedures is justified only when the system serves a large number of employers of similar size.
62.  Given that the specialized technology has been developed in a particular country, its use in
another region or country may occur at constant average cost.  In other words, the economies of scale
may be dynamic, not static, in the sense that they are present at the birth of the new technology, but
disappear as more suppliers surpass the threshold of scale and invest in adapting the new technology.
Once the specialized know-how becomes diffused, additional units of service can be rendered at
constant average cost.  Current experience in a variety of countries suggests that decreasing costs
resulting  from  scale economies  in collections  continue up  to  300,000 workers,  or  some 30,000
employers, but this may represent just  the past of the pension industry, not the future.  For a small
country, there is a crucial difference between dynamic and static scale economies, because the former
can be tapped by allowing competition among firns  that have already made  the investment in the15  -
specialized  technology through their association with  international firms.  In contrast, static scale
economies are out of reach to small countries.
63.  The available information does not allow us to discard the hypothesis that there  also exist
significant scale economies in collection over the number of contributors and employers observed in
small countries.  For example, the fact that all Chilean  pension fund administrators (AFPs)  with less
than  100,000 members have decided not to integrate into collection (to avoid the fixed cost of the
specialized technology) does not settle the  issue of whether static or dynamic scale economies are
present.  This evidence may  be representative of  a  past when  Chile was the only  country with
competitive  pension  management  companies,  or  it  may  show  the  importance  of  static  scale
economies.  Evidence of these scale economies may be seen in the fact that SERVIPAG, a specialized
Chilean  collection  company  that  services financial  companies,  utilities, and  small  pension fund
management companies, has not been challenged by large-scale entry of other firms into this market.
However, this same evidence may be seen as the result of restrictions on bank and AFP entry into this
specialized business.
64.  Economies of scale do obtain in a small country.  In this case, both conditions for natural
monopoly (sunk and  fixed costs) would be present. If the relative  size of these economies  were
substantial, competition among  pension management companies that are vertically integrated  into
collections would favor the largest ones at the local level. In a small country, this process would lead
to a concentrated market structure and higher charges, and to concentration of the trustee function.
Given the negative impact of this latter outcome on the political risk affecting pensions, there may be
a case for the government to intervene in collections.
65.  The  required  intervention would  be  to  prohibit  vertical  integration  of  collection  and
processing of contributions with the other functions.  The gain from prohibiting vertical integration is
that  it prevents concentration of the trustee  function. However, forced disintegration does impose
costs.  For example, looking in the membership archives held by the account manager allows a cheap
solution to some types of errors, while avoiding contact with the employer.  Some of these savings
can also be obtained by a monopoly collector arranging to be in contact with the processing center of
each pension management company.  We now consider several options to organize the provision of
collections services, given the mandated disintegration of this service.
66.  Policy options in collection and raw processing of contributions.  The first option is a
nationalized  monopoly.  This  appears attractive  in  small  countries that  have  a  well-functioning
personal income tax collection system, because collections related to pensions can piggyback on that
infrastructure. This has been tried in Argentina through DGI, a government-run entity, and could be
attempted in small countries such as Costa Rica that have a fairly well-functioning personal income
tax collection system. The costs of collections per form charged by DGI is US$ 4.0, and there is just
one  invoice (planilla) per employer.  An important problem with this option is that a government
collection  agency  may  not  have  incentives  to  adopt  the  most  cost  efficient  technologies  for
collections, but rather may wish to offer more employment to relatives and political supporters.  For
example,  DGI uses  a  lot of manual labor and  has yet to adapt the new technologies.  A  second
important problem is that the nationalized monopoly may charge a large monopoly margin not subject
to regulation, which acts as a hidden, unlegislated tax on labor. these factors may explain why the
price  for collections charged by DGI is four times that charged by Chilean banks, and at least  12
times the cost of large vertically integrated  AFPs.- 16 -
67.  A  second option is to  periodically auction off the collection service to the one or several
providers that offer the lowest charge per form. However, this is vulnerable to renegotiation because
of the large sunk costs involved.
68.  A third  option is for  a private monopoly subject to tariff  regulation to provide collection
services.  Such  an  option  presents  substantial problems  because  regulation  is  very  difficult  to
implement effectively when the costs of providing collection services are very sensitive to technical
change.  In addition, there  is no stock of expertise about regulating these entities, contrary to what
happens in electricity and telecommunications.  It should be recalled that preventing high charges is
more important in small than in large countries because high charges force a reduction in benefits.
69.  A fourth option is for collection to be provided by a self-regulated open capital company,
where the shareholders include the entities buying collecdion services, including the private pension
management companies.  The government's role would be reduced to  imposing the obligation to
allow entry on an equitable basis to new pension fund management companies, and the obligation of
charging all  pension fund management companies for collection services on the same basis.  The
government would also have to prevent this self-regulatory organization from serving as a cartel for
its members by charging prices far in excess of its costs.  On the positive side, the govemment could
impose  an  obligation  of  confidentiality about  contributors and  pensioners,  as  well  as  corporate
governance regulations that create incentives for efficient self-regulation of the collection company.
70.  This last option appears to be the best for small countries that have no personal income tax
collection  infrastructure  in place.  Sometimes a  mixed  approach may  be attractive.  Some of the
activities  included  in  "collection  and  processing  of  contributions"  may  be  run  separately.  For
example, the Peruvian Superintendency of Pensions runs the processing functions related to error
management. Although currently the private pension management companies in Peru collect forms,
they could do so through a cooperative.
2. Payment of Benefits
71.  If  traditional  banking  technology  is  used,  payment  services  are  subject  to  total  costs
proportional to the number of beneficiaries, although the existence of infrastructure such as a network
of automated teller machines (ATMs) can have a significant impact on these costs. significant scale
economies seem  to exist  in  benefit payments within the range observed  in small countries, e.g.,
100,000 pensioners in Bolivia.  In addition, the gains from specialization in such services seem to be
large, due to widespread geographic coverage, few service hours per month, and the fact that there is
a relatively small  number of pensioners.  Again, specialized know-how  gives rise to  sunk costs,
which, combined with scale economies, create a kind of natural monopoly in smaller countries.  The
options discussed above for data collection would also apply to the payments function.
3.  Data Capture
72.  Within the function of data processing of contribution information, there is a specific activity
called "data capture," in which each individual line of a form is typed into a computer.  It is generally
considered a variable cost because it is proportional to the number of contributors being processed.
This  type  of  service  can be  provided by  each pension  fund management  entity at  similar  cost- 17 -
regardless  of the scale of operations. However,  the cost does  depend  substantially  on unit labor  costs,
so it may be attractive  to subcontract  this function  to the lowest  cost provider,  or even  to an offshore
provider.  Contracting  with firms abroad is now standard  practice in the processing  of credit card
debits.  Regulations  should  allow  free subcontracting  of this activity,  particularly  in small  countries.
4. Account Administration and Processing
73.  Account administration and processing includes investment accounting and recalculation of
individual account balances.  This function is subject to substantial economies of scale in relation to
the niumber  of accounts  administered  and processed.  The main fixed costs are specialized  computer
programming personnel, software, and equipment. In large Chilean pension management companies,
a major part of the error correction and checking processes occurs at  this stage.  Accounting cost
evidence from the Chilean market suggests that average processing costs may fall to a third of initial
costs  when  the  number of  members rises  from 200,000  to  I  million.  Further  evidence of the
economies of scale in processing is that small pension management companies in Argentina and Chile
purchase processing  services from a  few  major computer systems  companies,  such as  IBM and
SON  DA, who do not experience much competition.
74.  IBM and SONDA also provide a number of pension-related services in a single standardized
package, so a relatively small trustee company can obtain access to attractive average costs with little
effort.  These packages comprise most of the services present  in the  "master trust"  arrangements
observed in the United States and Australia, with two exceptions: custody and selection, and control
of portfolio managers.
75.  The economies of scale in account administration and processing may seem problematic in
small countries.  For example, in Bolivia where perhaps no more than 200,000 members are served
and at least six different trustees must compete to limit political risk, private providers of processing
services  would  not  be  able  to  realize  the  scale  economies  noted  above  if  each  pension  fund
administrator undertook these services in-house.  More importantly, even contracting out of account
processing within Bolivia would not achieve  these economies of scale.
76.  In Bolivia, these  problems  in account administration and  processing  could be solved by
allowing trustees to subcontract account administration and processing abroad.  For international  trade
to be effective, it is important that regulations do not impose special requirements on the types of
reports or other uses of the information, or define a specific processing method that creates fixed costs
that will have to be shared throughout the country. In the Bolivian case, the key role for govemment
is to harmonize standards to permit  international firms to offer processing  services on or offshore.
This will allow account processing functions not only to be privately supplied, but to be competitive
in  terms  of  cost.  International companies,  specializing  in  information  processing  (EDS,  IBM,
SONDA) will compete to provide the service much more efficiently and at lower cost, passing along
the economies of scale to Bolivian consumers.
5. New  Technologies
77.  The new electronic  technologies,  such as Electronic  Data Interchange  (EDI), promise  small
countries  a  substantial reduction  in  the  administrative cost  of  pension  systems  by  permitting  a
complete  integration  and  dematerialization  of  many  different  pension  services  at  once.  Cost- 18 -
reductions  can result from decreasing  documentation requirements and security  checks needed to
effect transfers of funds, transfers among pension fund investment management entities, collections,
benefit payments, and reporting to members about the status of their accounts.  Such a system can
also reduce costs by dematerializing these functions, which can be performed through direct computer
entries at every stage of  pension service provision (see Box 3). Through EDI, many of the processing
functions can be transferred abroad, where economies of scale may be available at very low cost.
78.  However, this promise will materialize in a small country only if free trade in new computer
technology is allowed and if a good telecommunications infrastructure is available.  For many small
countries, this  expectation may  be premature.  However, an  important policy  implication is that
multilateral  and  other donors actively  seek to  assist small developing countries  in  acquiring this
infrastructure.
6. Client  Services
79.  The costs of providing client services depend on the quality of service, including aspects such
as the variety and frequency of the services that must be provided.  These costs  generally do  not
exhibit scale economies.  Quality of service varies with the frequency with which account statements
must be sent to the client, the way in which returns must be calculated, and the degree to which the
provider of the service is required to address  individual consumer requests regarding his account.
Achieving a specified quality of service does not require vertical integration of other functions. For
example, SONDA offers an on-line connection to small ChileanAFPs so that its customers can obtain
details about their accounts from SONDA's computers in real time.
80.  The problem  with client  services  is that  regulators may  require an  excessive  quality  of
service.  To allow costs  to  remain  low, supervisors should not require on-line  answers to  client
questions regarding statements of account, especially in small countries where  telecommunications
are expensive or unreliable.- 19  -
Box 3.  EDI Chile (Electronic Data Interchange in Chile)
The electronic data interchange  system  was developed  to transfer  information  between  different  entities  and businesses
through electronic  means,  and to use computers  to send, read, select, store, and respond  to messages  and information
requests. In the case of EDT  Chile,  common  norms  and standards  set by the UN/EDIFACT  (United  Nations  Electronic  Data
Interchange  for Administrators,  Commerce  and Transport)  are used,  and a value  added  network  (VAN-EDI)  has been  set up
to facilitate  the process, providing  security  and compatibility  among users  of the service.  Four companies  already offer
VAN.EDI services in Chile (Easy Mail, Edibank,  Inn, and Transaxion).  through them, it is possible to exchange
inforrnation;  send,  reply  to, and modify  invoices,  payments,  and purchase  orders;  transfer  funds;  etc. Edibank  is owned  by
cham'bers  of commerce,  commercial  banks,  and AFPs.
For the Chilean  pension  system,  EDI could  prove  advantageous  in the following  areas: (i) collections,  (ii) management  of
funds, (iii) transfer  of information  and accounts  among AFPs,  (iv) consultations  with and notifications  to employers,  (v)
transfer  of annuities  and payments,  and (vi) the return  of invalid  voluntary  contributions.  The use of EDI is expected  to
reduce  time and administrative  costs in all areas  for  AFPs and employers.  Collections  will be done through a single  form
(one From  each employer)  and funds will  be transferred  electronically  to each AFPs bank account. The management  of
funds, the purchase  or sale of securities,  etc., will also be done on-line, thus saving time and money for AFPs and
commercial  and investment  banks. EDI will also allow for the transfer  of accounts  among  AFPs without  the need to
physically  exchange  files, therefore  diminishing  the possibility  of losing information  and time.  Other benefits  include
electronically  based  reporting  and the ability  to provide  additional  information  to the superintendency  using preapproved
formats, which will facilitate  its supervisory  capabilities.  The expected  total cost reductions  are significant  despite the
reduced  number  of employers  that  will  have  the initial  capability  to use EDI.  In Chile,  only  2,000  of the 200,000  employers
are expected  to use EDI.
7.  Regulatory Compliance and Reporting
81.  The costs  of reporting to the  supervisory agency depend on  the frequency, quantity,  and
complexity of the reports required with respect to benefits, the investment portfolio, and  financial
statements  and  accounts. Real time  systems of  control  and  off-sight  supervision  of  investment
portfolios  are  also  expensive.  Thus,  part  of  the  administrative  work  required  of  a  pension
management company will be fixed by the reporting standards. Since this is a fixed cost, it generates
ecornomies  of scale. Given the implications of scale economies in small countries, supervisors in small
countries should be particularly careful to determine whether each required report is justified.
82.  In  small  countries, where  imperfections in  the  domestic equity  market  are  more  likely,
regulations relating to minimum capital are more likely to generate a fixed cost. The conventional
justification  for requiring minimum capital from trustee pension management companies is to ensure
their commitment to the market.  However, the minimum capital that is justified may be much smaller
if  collection  is  separate  and  processing  is  subcontracted than  if  pension  services are  vertically
integrated. Thus, this aspect of prudential regulation design deserves special attention in the small
country case and is not independent of other aspects of pension reform.
83.  The scale economies of many types of costs also depend on the type of regulation to which
the pension management companies are subject.  In Chile, replacing the detailed regulation imposed
by the superintendency with modem supervisory approaches, such as focusing on the quality of the
internal control system rather than on each operation, is thought to have reduced personnel needs by
more than 60 percent. Hence, the impact on scale economies is clear.- 20  -
8. Portfolio Investment Management
84.  Unlike many of the services discussed so far, portfolio investment management services are
not characterized by large sunk costs, with the possible exception of advertising costs associated with
market penetration. In addition, investment management does not involve large economies of scale.
That is why the large market of portfolio investment management services that has emerged in the
United States and Europe to serve occupational pension funds is supplied by small firms.
85.  In  small  countries,  it  is useful to  separate  the  discussion  of  domestic and  international
portfolio management. Regarding domestic portfolios, the lack of independent interests, if coupled
with a small number of portfolio management firms, could create the potential for price manipulation
or conflicts of interest in domestic asset markets.  The lack of liquidity in small country securities
markets  can  permit  irregularities  in the  valuation  of  domestic  securities  portfolios  and  create
incentives for  manipulation  among market participants.  This  can  increase the risk of fraud and
insolvency for contributors to these pension schemes.  There are three ways to tackle these problems:
(a) improve supervision of the domestic market, which is costly in terms of specialized human capital;
(b) stimulate trading of domestic securities by domestic investors in foreign stock and bond markets,
to take advantage of their supervision; and (c) require that perhaps as much as 40 to 50 percent of the
investment portfolio be invested offshore in investment-grade securities.
86.  Trustees  based  in  small  countries  must  hire  foreign  managers  to  take  care  of  their
international portfolios.  Direct cross-border provision of these services must be permitted.  To reduce
the  burden  on  domestic  regulators  that  wish  to  ensure  that  these  managers  are  trustworthy,
arrangements for certification should be set up through cross-border agreements between supervision
authorities, and regulatory accounting principles should be harmonized.
87.  Another problem in countries that want to copy the Chilean regulation requiring the portfolio
manager to post a performance bond of 1 percent of assets under management is that the performance
bond  requirement  is  difficult  to  pass  on  to  foreign  portfolio  managers.  This  problem  is  not
fundamental, but a result of a difference in format:  if international managers do not perform,  their
contract is not renewed.  Therefore, a simple way of facilitating the subcontracting of international
managers is to redefine the performance bond to be more easily understandable, such as "30 percent
of the  income of the pension management company, net of collection, processing, insurance and
administrative costs."  An arrangement along these lines is needed in small countries because they
rely heavily on subcontracted foreign portfolio managers.
88.  A related problem appears when the regulations define a benchmark portfolio made up of
domestic securities and then  impose it on the international portfolio. To avoid delaying or blocking
investment abroad, two options may be considered: (a) defining a different benchmark for each part of
the total portfolio; and (b) defining a global benchmark that includes both domestic and international
investments.- 21  -
Box 4.  Insurance in Bolivia
In Bolivia,  2 local  insurance  companies  collect  50  percent  of all  premia,  and  only  7 of 18 companies  were
technically  solvent as of 1992.  This concentration  was largely  due to regulatory  entry barriers  as well as to
impediments  in the insurance  law, which did not permit  cross-border  provision  of insurance  services. In other
small  countries  (e.g., Costa Rica),  the insurance  industry  is completely  monopolized  by the Govemment.
9. Imsurance Provision
89.  It is useful to distinguish two types of insurance: (a) short-term coverage, such as disability
and survivorship or life coverage, which  is usually purchased by the trustee pension management
company on behalf of members; and (b)  long-term coverage for longevity risk, provided through
annuities at the time of retirement.  The first type of short-term coverage is largely reinsured abroad in
small  countries  due  to  worldwide  economies  of  scale  in  reinsurance.  the  second,  longer-term
insurance service is sold to individuals and is not characterized by large scale or scope economies
even in small countries.
90.  In  the  provision  of  longevity  insurance,  advertising  and  information  (relationship  and
reputation) can create important barriers to entry, which tend to increase concentration, political risk,
and average charges (see Box 4).  These problems are best solved in small countries by allowing
cross-border  provision  of  annuity  insurance  by  certified  insurance  companies  with  a  suitably
supervised home office.  Elimination of regulatory and legal barriers and harmonization of insurance
regulations to  allow the  local use  of  at  least a  few  foreign insurance  providers  of annuities  is
recommended for small countries.
91.  In small countries the lack of specialized human capital may justify changesto some aspects
of the pension system.  First, mandatory disability insurance requires establishing specialized medical
commissions to assess disability claims.  An option is to make this form of coverage available on a
voluntary basis only, via employer or  individually. Second, technical  information about mortality,
expressed in life tables, will be less reliable in a small country due to relatively greater international
labo:r  mobility. This problem raises the risk that the mortality table is wrong, which will induce life
insurance companies to  increase the price of annuities.  One way to keep these costs in check is to
allow the use of the TIAA-CREF formula (see Section VC, below) for self-insured annuities, where
this risk is borne by pensioners as a whole.
10.  Entry, Market Size, and Level of Wages
92.  In small countries,  development of the  privatization option  in  pension service provision
cannot be viewed independently from the size of the market to be served (the number of individual
accounts) or the level of wages of contributors.  Market size can effect the desire of major foreign
investors to compete through direct entry, especially when pension services are provided through a
vertically integrated  industrial  structure.  This kind of problem is best  illustrated by  the case  of
Bolivia.  If it is assumed that not more than 200,000 active workers are contributing to individualize
accounts and  that the  monthly wages  are about  US$200 per  month,  the  flow  of resources  into- 22  -
privately managed accounts would be US$50 million.  If a typical company obtains 25 percent of this
market, and commissions are 1.5 percent just  for pension services (excluding insurance), the gross
income before any costs would be US$2 million for a single company.  The annual income for the
whole industry would be US$10 million.  Therefore, the fixed and variable costs of competing against
vertically integrated entities will make direct entry by foreignAFPs unlikely, given high sunk costs
and scale economies noted above.
93.  Under these circumstances, inducing competition in a small economy will require that that
pension services be unbundled (vertically disintegrated) so that entry can occur within each level of
pension services or be provided through international subcontracting. What is clear is that the small
size of the market will hinder foreign investment less in provision of some aspects of pension services
(e.g., fund investment management services) than in others (e.g., collections, etc.).
IV.  DEMAND FOR PENSION SERVICES
94.  This  section  reviews  the  demand  factors  specific  to  small  countries  that  can  reduce
competition among private firms providing pension services.  There are a number of demand factors
that reduce competition in large and small  countries alike (see Valdes, Prieto,  1994) that  are not
discussed in detail in this section.
A.  General Issues
95.  Despite this paper's  overall focus on  small countries, it is useful to mention some generic
issues, such as the fact that reputation may act as a  barrier to entry. Demand for  retail financial
services sold to individuals is commonly influenced by the relative solvency and size of providers.
There is a natural advantage for the pension trustee that is perceived as being the "largest" or having
the strongest "capital backing."  One approach to mitigating this problem is for  local regulation to
allow  reporting  of the  assets  managed  by  the  parent  companies  of  each  local  pension trustee
company. A complementary approach is to avoid prohibitions against using the brand names of the
parent companies, including existing banks.
96.  Another factor reducing competition in service provision by private firms is that of many
individual contributors are insensitive to price competition (for more detail, seeValdes-Prieto, 1995).
One approach to managing this problem is to impose regulations that ensure that commissions are
deducted from either salaries or pensions, not from the outstanding balance of the fund, so that they
are perceived  in the  present. Another  approach is to  allow collective  group  plans,  which  allow
consumers to overcome the fixed costs of the specialized knowledge required to compare the quality
of the  services offered by  pension trustees. Although small firms cannot easily  afford  experts in
financial matters to perform this service for their workers (e.g., such as personal investment advisors),
one  option  is to  facilitate the  formation of  associations of  small  employers  for  the  purpose  of
performing the bargaining function for their members, as happens voluntarily in Switzerland (iifiga,
1993), and as undertaken by Australian Industry Funds (Bateman et al., 1995). A final approach to the
price-insensitivity problem is to  avoid regulations that prevent competitive trustees  from offering
discounts to consumers who switch less frequently, in proportion to the cost reduction allowed by
their behavior.- 23  -
B. Pension Product Design
97.  An important factor to consider in the design of pension products is the denomination of
pension benefits. In general, consumer demand is for "real" pensions, meaning pensions indexed to
the  local cost  of living, that keep purchasing power constant. It is sometimes thought that private
pension providers  cannot produce real pensions, but this  is  incorrect. In several countries where
companies and banks have  been allowed to issue indexed long-term debt securities, and taxes have
been redefined to take inflation into account, these debt markets have emerged and flourished as long
as the government has not manipulated the local inflation index. The government can also contribute
by issuing indexed long-term public debt. Once these instruments are available, insurance companies
can produce CPI-indexed annuities, as they do in Chile and the U.K.
98.  However, matters may be different in a small developing country. It may be difficult for a
liquid market in long-term debt indexed to the domestic CPI to emerge if few local companies are
large enough to issue safe long-term debt securities. Two issuers of long-term indexed securities can
be counted  upon: the  local government and  indexed  mortgage loans, whose future  incomes  are
responsive  to the  domestic price  level. However, the  amounts these issuers  can supply  is much
smaller than what is required to invest the total pension wealth of pensioners, which may rise to 60
percent of GNP if the pension system has total coverage. Even if the supply of CPI-indexed securities
is large enough for pensioners' needs, an additional large amount is needed to invest a significant
portion  of the  portfolio of active workers. If this  additional amount  is not available, the pensio-n
accounts of active workers will compete for those securities. Mutual funds, commercial banks and
other investors may also compete to hold such securities. This will not only reduce the yield on such
securities, but will also attract less reliable companies to the issue of indexed debt, increasing the
credlit  risk in such securities. The increase in credit risk will require extra payments to shareholders of
life insurance companies,  which can be achieved only  by  further reducing the rate of  return on
annjities.  Overall, this  implies that real annuities will  be more expensive, i.e., will  pay  a  lower
amcunt per month in a small than in a large country.
99.  Therefore, it is predictable that in small developing countries the demand for pensions will be
a demand for pensions denominated in the main international reserve currencies, such as U.S. dollars,
German  marks, and  yen.  It will be shown below that  this  is desirable but that  it imposes some
requirements on  the authorities. In particular, they  should commit to unrestricted convertibility of
pension incomes into domestic currency. If there is a risk that exchange controls will force pensioners
to convert their foreign currency pension into domestic currency at an unfavorable exchange rate, the
creclibility of this product will be destroyed.
100.  A pension denominated in the main international reserve currencies is riskier than a pension
denominated  in the domestic CPI. The purchasing power of a  nominal pension is risky for three
reasons: (a) actual international inflation in the reserve currency will differ from expected inflation;
(b) actual domestic inflation in a small country differs from actual inflation abroad, even if the small
country uses as its currency the international currency and has no separate currency; and (c) if the
small country has a separate currency, there is exchange risk. None of these risks can be eliminated
by  diversification.  Although  a  pension  denominated  in  the  domestic  CPI  index  is  safer,  it  is
significantly lower in a small country, as explained above.- 24  -
101.  Given that cheap pension products will be risky in a small country in any case, it is sensible
to allow pensioners to take on some investment risks, which may partially diversify those related to
inflation and exchange rates. Two examples are variable rate annuities and the formulae used in the
United  States by  TIAA-CREF since  1952 for  the  retirement of college  teachers  and  professors
(Greenough,  1990), both of which allow graduation of the size of investment risk by changing the
portfolio of investments. The TIAA-CREF formula is important because it is the only one that allows
pensioners to  take  the risk that the  mortality table is wrong,  and avoids  paying  a  life insurance
company a fee for guaranteeing this risk. The TIAA-CREF formula has the additional advantage for
small countries of requiring less scarce human capital for regulation. Allowing the sale of annuities
requires imposing strict solvency regulations on life insurance companies to avoid financial fraud, but
the TIAA-CREF formula does not need to impose such restrictions because it operates like a mutual
fund.
102.  The authorities of a small country should allow these pension products to be produced by
domestic  life  insurance companies  as well as  by  international companies.  This  implies assuring
domestic life insurance companies access to foreign exchange with the purpose of investing part of
their assets abroad, in long-term fixed-income securities that allow matching of assets and liabilities
(pension promises). In addition, workers should be shielded from conversion risk at pensioning age,
i.e., the risk that the value of their account balance will fall in terms of reserve currency just  before
pensioning. This  outcome can be insured by  allowing the funds of active workers to be invested
abroad as well. If capital controls prevent these investments, pensions will fall in quality.
103.  A pension denominated in the main international reserve currencies that pays a flat amount
over time should be modified to improve its quality. If a pension pays a fixed amount of international
currency per period,  it is bound to lose purchasing power over time because inflation in all reserve
currencies is above zero. This problem will not be dealt with by competition. For example, if constant
U.S. dollar annuities are allowed, it is predictable that the purchasing power of the annuity will be
much larger at the date of issue than after 20 years. A constant annuity denominated in German marks
might be expected to hold its purchasing power to a larger extent, because its expected inflation is
lower.  In that case, competition among providers will recognize this fact and force the dollar annuity
to pay a higher nominal amount, which will be higher in real terms in the initial periods but lower in
real terms later on.
104.  However, an important feature of pension demand comes into play  in designing a pension
that maintains its "real value':  improvident  workers will prefer the U.S. dollar annuity because it pays
a higher pension in the first years, and they don't care much about the far future. This outcome puts
into doubt the effectiveness of the policy of mandating contributions. The problem can be solved by a
further regulation, which  is to require newly issued pensions to promise payment of an increasing
amount  of  the  international  currency, with  the  minimum  rate  of  increase  equal  to  the  current
expectation of inflation for that currency in the long term, which may be calculated automatically
from the prices of long-term nominal debt. This regulation is needed only in small countries, because
big countries can restrict pensions to those denominated in the local CPI.- 25  -
V.  OTHER  CONSIDERATIONS  FOR PENSION POLICY
105  This section discusses how the elements of pension economics can be applied to  a small
country, and how some broader policy recommendations will differ from those for larger countries, if
the small country is characterized not only by a small  contribution base but many of a number of
other characteristics.  Among the most important of those are:  greater international mobility capital
than  large countries; relatively greater scarcity of human capital specialized in the financial sector or
in enforcement of tax policies, in many cases,  proportionally greater gross migration of the  labor
force, causing demographic instability; and fewer independent interests.
A.  Objectives of Pension Policy
106.  There are three  well-established objectives of national pension policy: (a) to  alleviate the
market failures that limit the efficiency and reliability of private capital markets for voluntary saving
and insurance; (b) to help improvident individuals by ensuring that they save and insure prudently. An
aspect of this objective is to prevent individuals who rely on support from family, community, or the
state from exploiting that support by failing to save adequately;  and (c) to help the elderly poor who
could not save enough during their working lives for survival in old age (World Bank, 1994).
107.  Other  objectives,  such  as  capital  accumulation  and  redistribution  of  wealth  between
generations, can be achieved with tools other than pension policy, such as fiscal policy and national
debt policy.  Thus, pension policy should focus on the three objectives mentioned above, where it is
indispensable. The  use  of pension policy for  these  other objectives  is  inefficient if this  implies
sacirificing  the three proper objectives, because the proper use of other policy tools can have achieve
botrh  objectives together.
108.  Objective (c), income redistribution towards the long-term poor, is not the focus of this paper,
but merits discussion. The income distribution effects of a pension system can be classified between
intended and  unintended. Two examples of intended redistribution are a minimum pension and  a
benefit  formula  that  includes  a  fixed  amount  of  benefits  plus  some  proportion of  past  wages.
Unintended redistribution in favor of high-income workers occurs for many reasons. One is that high-
income workers naturally take more advantage of fiscal incentives. Defined-benefit schemes are more
prone to  unintended redistribution because the benefit formula  is not adjusted for the  higher  life
expectancy of richer people.  Similarly, defined benefit schemes that rely on the average earnings of
the last few years of  work do not adjust for the fact that high-income people have a steeper age-
earnings profile.
1093.  Intended income redistribution through the pension system finds a tough competitor in tax
and transfer systems. In most countries, the pension system covers just  formal sector workers, which
means middle and high-income workers. In this setting, redistribution among covered workers leaves
oul;  the really poor, who work in the informal sector or do not have employers to act as collection
agents, as in the subsistence and communal sectors of developing countries. Granting pensions to the
poor elderly requires, in most countries, the use of institutional vehicles different from formal social
security, such as municipal  networks to  distribute transfers  financed by the  national government.
Collecting revenue from independent workers is possible, as proposed for Latvia JHolzmann, 1994),
but requires an administrative effort.- 26  -
110.  Income redistribution is more difficult to pursue in small countries, because they are subject
to greater international labor mobility than large countries. This reduces the efficiency of all policies
and institutions for  redistribution,  including the pension system.  For example,  citizens may  have
frequent and extended periods of work abroad, while many foreigners work in the domestic economy
for years.  This may imply that somebody who contributed for a few years can still obtain full support
when returning to the country at age 65.  Conversely, the elderly poor who arrived in the country to
work at age 55 may be considered ineligible for support. Income distribution through pensions may
imply undesired redistribution between alien residents and local emigrants who return, increasing the
economic inefficiency and the political problems associated with these policies.
111.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  other  two  objectives  of  pension  policy,  namely  helping
improvident individuals, and alleviating the market failures of the capital markets that provide savings
and insurance products.
B. Preconditions for Successful Pension Policy
112.  The tools of pension policy are: (a) financial supervision that  improves the reliability and
efficiency of voluntary saving and insurance by attacking market failures; (b) mandates to contribute
in exchange for rights to benefits (a simultaneous tax-transfer program); and (c) fiscal incentives to
favored schemes (usually exemptions from the income tax for occupational and mandatory pension
funds).
113.  A pension policy cannot exist if these tools cannot be utilized in an efficient manner. There
are many poor developing countries, especially in Africa, in which the government does not have the
human capital or institutional infrastructure in place to use these tools.  Thus, these countries should
not have a national pension  policy. If a developing country attempts to adopt a pension policy when
the tools of pension policy cannot be developed or cannot be expected to be minimally effective, the
social cost will be larger than the social benefit. In this case, it is better not to have a national pension
policy.
114.  This is an unfortunate outcome from the point of view of old-age security, but it is the best
that can be done and it is certainly not detrimental to economic development. To understand this, it is
useful to recall that the United States adopted its social security program as late as 1939, South Korea
as late as 1988, and Australia as late as 1986-1992, after each had become developed countries. The
United Kingdom did not mandate contributions for old-age pensions until 1908, well after the second
industrial revolution. When the preconditions for a national pension policy are not met, a workable
alternative is for the country to provide for old age through family support, community support, and
occupational pension plans for some government employees (armed forces, police, judges).  Such
arrangements already exist in many small countries.
115.  There is a second group of small countries where just a few of the tools of national pension
policy can be made to operate efficiently, while the other tools cannot operate. In this case the menu
of policy tools is more restricted, but it is still possible for a pension policy to exist.  The conclusion,
then, is that the identification of policy tools that can be used reliably in a given country is the critical
input  in  support  of  a  specific  pension policy  recommendation. There  are  a  number  of  policy
recommendations that may fail to pass this test, as discussed below. We now outline the preconditions
for using each one of the tools of pension policy.- 27  -
1. Supervision to Improve Voluntary Saving
116.  Legal  framework and  supervision.  This policy seeks to  prevent  fraud and  abuse  and
minimize the risk of insolvency on the part of institutions providing voluntary savings and insurance
products.  This objective must be attained while creating adequate incentives for financial services to
be provided efficiently.  A first precondition for using the tool of financial supervision is that the
government supply a reliable body of civil and commercial law to make enforcement effective. This
must include a judicial  system of reasonable quality to adjudicate conflicts between consumers and
financial firms (see Section 11  for somewhat more detail).
117.  A second precondition is for the govemment to supply specialized financial sector laws and
effective ongoing supervision of financial intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies, and
securities markets. Many small countries find it difficult to perform this function, since it requires a
substantial amount of specialized human capital.
118.  Since  small countries may  have difficulty  meeting these  two  preconditions  for  effective
supervision, an attractive option can be to allow intemational trade in these services, thereby relying
on  the financial supervision, financial  sector laws,  and even  civil  laws of  larger  countries. For
example, financial contracts may be signed under the jurisdiction of another  country, and financial
firms may be required to be branches of licensed suppliers in well-supervised countries. In this way,
the residents of small countries would still have access to efficient, voluntary saving and insurance. In
the case of retail financial products where consumer protection is an issue, such as life insurance, the
small country should require that the supplier be subject to consumer protection charges under a
larger country's laws for its domestic sales.
119.  Voluntary saving and supervision.  In cases where small countries allow domestic financial
intermediaries to develop new financial instruments for voluntary saving for old age, the govemment
should devote substantial effort to supervising these instruments, because foreign supervision will not
apply. This is the case  with the Costa  Rican voluntary individualized defined  contribution plans
offered by both onshore and offshore banks to residents of other Central American countries, and
with the Paraguayan pension plans (see Box 5).- 28  -
Box 5.  Voluntary Saving and Cooperative Pension Schemes in Costa Rica and Paraguay
"Complementary" pension funds in Costa Rica came into existence in 1989, prior to being sanctioned by law. The industry
continues to be largely self-regulated.  As of 1993,  about individual accounts were being offered by Costa Rican banks.
These pension plans are voluntary defined-contribution schemes. The tax laws have been interpreted as allowing employers
to make pre-tax contributions (taxable upon withdrawal at retirement), while employee contributions are post tax. Entities
offering this pension service do so by establishing a trust (fideicomiso) and an  associated trust agreement among  the
employees, employer, and the management company. In the case of BANEX, those that leave the fund must give 6 months
notice, but the bank may pay before the 6 months expires if it wishes to.  A maximum of 50% of the account balance can be
withdrawn with the same 6 months notice, but not before 12 months after the previous withdrawal.  Withdrawals in the first
three years of the contract life are subject to substantial fees.
BANEX  charges fees equal to  10 percent of the total nominal  return on the funds invested.  In general, this  type of
commission structure could create incentives for taking excessive investment risk, because the commission may be much
larger if the return is high, which can usually be sustained only by taking larger risks.  However, in this case the nominal
return  includes a  hefty  inflation component because inflation  is 20%  in Costa  Rica,  and the  commission  is  in fact
proportional to the assets under management. Moreover, any difference between high and low real returns translates into a
much smaller difference between high and low nominal returns when inflation is high. Therefore, the incentive for excessive
risktaking is muted.  In practice. the complementary funds have been invested only in government securities under current
self-regulatory standards, thereby ensuring safety but not  permitting much diversification. The policy  lesson is that the
current commission structure may well create perverse incentives in the future when inflation falls. The industry should not
be expected to swiftly adapt its self-regulatory standards to a drop in inflation, so supervision and regulation are needed for
the survival of this valuable service in the long run.
The Caja Mutual de Cooperativistas (CMC) of Paraguay, founded in 1985, is an extraordinary institution. It offers voluntary
entry to a collective defined-benefit program to the individual members of cooperatives that have joined the CMC. By the
end of 1993, 10% of all cooperatives in the country, or 4,548 people, were contributing to the CMC. Monthly contributions
are a function of the income declared by the member and his age, starting at 3.0% for age 20 and rising to 7.8% at age 49,
subject to a floor equal to the minimum wage and to a ceiling equal to 10 times the floor. Once issued, the pension amount in
guarantes (Paraguay's  currency) is adjusted once a year according to the average of the indexing clauses reported by the
active members.  An annuity is issued at age 55 if membership in CMC started before age 40, provided that contributions
were made for at least 16 years. There are even more generous clauses for the initial generation: the annuity is issued at age
60 if the number of years of contributions is at least II and membership started between ages 40 and 49. Furthermore, the
CMC board may grant pensions to even older people, those who reach age 65. provided they entered between ages 50 and 60
and have contributed for at least 6 years. In August 1994 the pension fund had US$ 5.3 million in assets under management.
Although almost all of the assets are invested in consumer loans to members, members are charged market rates and
nonperforming loans are just 2.8% of the total.
Given the relative size of contribution rates and benefits, CMC is technically insolvent, but in the chain letter tradition it is
increasing coverage and delaying the day of reckoning.  The number of contributors has been growing at an average of
34.5% per year for the last 5 years. and most are young.  There is no supervision of these contracts.
120.  The  case  of  voluntary  saving  and  insurance  benefits  offered  by employers  raises  important
questions of consumer protection. In a setting with no fiscal incentives, occupational plans may be
offered by employers to unsophisticated workers who do not realize the potential for fraud that such
arrangements entail. For example, in defined-benefit plans the employer may fail to  build a  fund
(either directly, by manipulation of the actuarial assumptions, or by failing to diversify investments
away from the firm itself). The employer may also choose to reduce the rate of wage increase of those
who are about to get a pension, and may dissolve the firm when the benefit expense becomes large. In
defined-contribution occupational plans the employer selects the fund manager, an arrangement that
raises the danger that the employer will hire a manager whose affiliate firms provide subsidized loans
to the employer, at the cost of low performance of the workers' investment portfolio.
121.  The solution to these problems is supervision and regulation of voluntary occupational plans.
However, small countries with little specialized human capital may find it difficult to perform this- 29  -
function. Again, one option may be to rely on foreign infrastructure,  which outlaws voluntary
occupational  plans that fail to meet internationally  recognized  actuarial,  disclosure,  and regulatory
standards. Although  precedents  are scarce, foreign  supervisory  bodies could be paid to supervise
occupational  pension plans within small countries. Alternatively,  external supervisors  could agree
with an association of providers  of voluntary  saving,  and insurance  mechanisms  for old age that
member firms put in place a self-regulatory  framework  (as in South  Africa  or New Zealand)  where
external supervisors  examine  the safeguards  imposed  by the association  (see Annex and Glaessner,
1994).
2. Fiscal  Incentives  to Licensed  Pension Schemes
122.  This tool of pension  policy  tries to deal with improvidence  by increasing  the private rate of
return of voluntary  saving and insurance.  Fiscal incentive  schemes  usually  provide  exemptions  from
income  tax for licensed  occupational  pension  plans and for licensed  personal  pension  plans such as
IRAs and 401(K) plans in the United  States, and personal pension plans in the United Kingdom.
Fiscal  incentives  can also consist  of cash subsidies  to licensed  personal  pension  plans,  as in the Czech
Republic.
123.  A significant  problem  with this tool is that it is regressive,  because high-income  workers
receive  more support  for any given saving  rate, and also because  such workers  already  tend to have
higlher  saving rates. A second problem  is that fiscal incentives  are expensive  when successful.  For
example,  in the U.K. the fiscal  cost of tax preferences  for occupational  pension  plans amounted  to 2.4
percent of GNP in 1993  (Blake, 1996).  This means  that this policy should not be used in countries
where the tax base is narrow  and weak. A weak tax base is more likely in small countries  because
higlher  capital mobility  makes  fiscal incentives  more  inefficient  at lower levels  of subsidy  than large
countries.
124.  Credible  implementation  of fiscal incentives.  The first precondition  for successful  use of
fiscal incentives is that commitments  to provide  promised  fiscal incentives  must be credible. One
necessary  element  for credibility  is a reliable  body of civil law. The second precondition  is that the
fiscal incentives  not be too expensive  for  the government.  If these  two conditions  cannot  be expected
to hold  for a long period -- measured in decades -- participants may not expect the fiscal incentive to
materialize. In this case, fiscal incentives  will be ineffective and substantial resources will be
dissipated  in attempts  to escape  taxation,  provoked  by suspicion  that the incentives  will be reversed.
This precondition  of credibility is more easily met in the Czech approach,  where the incentive is
granted  up front (it is protected  by property  rights),  but the fiscal  burden is felt at the initiation  of the
pollicy.
125.  Fiscal incentives  and administrative  resources.  A second  precondition  for successful  use
of fiscal  incentives is that they require few administrative resources.  However, substantial
adiministrative  capacities  are required  because  the aim of the fiscal incentive  is to stimulate  saving and
insurance  for old-age  at the margin,  and not merely  to reshuffle  transactions  and assets,  in which case
old age security would not be improved.  However,  a tax system that is sophisticated  enough to
provide an  effective incentive at the margin is more costly to  administer,  because it requires
individual  reporting  and follow  up of individual  wealth and income. This requirement  is especially
burdensome  in small countries,  because  human  capital specialized  in tax design  and administration  is
more difficult to find. In fact, even the United  States,  with its sophisticated  tax administration,  has- 30  -
found it difficult to turn IRA exemptions into effective tools in the sense of inducing individuals to
save more (Gravelle, 1991). We would expect this problem to be greater in small countries, where
there is greater international capital mobility and therefore tax administration more difficult because
more wealth is held abroad.
126.  In small  countries that  lack the  sophistication of personal  income taxation, occupational
pension plans can still be granted a tax exemption at low administrative cost, so they may appear to be
an attractive option.  One of the drawbacks of occupational plans, however, is that employers may
deceive workers about the actual value of their promises, as explained above.  A second drawback is
that occupational pension plans reduce labor mobility.  This problem can be quite costly in small
countries, whiclh rely on  international migration to  a greater extent  than  large  countries to  keep
balance in their labor markets without large fluctuations in unemployment and the real wage. In view
of this problem, giving tax breaks to  occupational plans is also not an attractive option for small
countries.
3.  Mandates to Contribute in Exchange for Rights to Benefits
127.  This policy tool deals directly with improvidence by imposing a quota on savings. Mandating
contributions is a more targeted tool than fiscal incentives because it helps to increase old age income
only for workers who are improvident. Total savings of provident workers are not affected, because
they simply reduce the voluntary saving rate as the mandatory saving rate is increased. Since many
workers are credit  constrained, especially the  improvident ones, mandatory  contributions are also
more effective than fiscal  incentives, because the incentives required to induce a credit-constrained
worker to save voluntarily are quite large; that worker would rather borrow at the market interest rate.
A third  advantage  is that  a  mandate to  save is fiscally inexpensive. A  fourth  advantage  is that
mandating is less regressive than fiscal incentives, because improvident high-income workers do not
receive fiscal support.
128.  Mandatory contributions and distortions in savings allocation.  Despite the advantages of
mandating contributions, this tool leads to a distortion to personal savings that is avoided by fiscal
incentives.  Savings under mandatory contribution schemes cannot be recovered except as pension
benefits, which eliminates their value as precautionary savings, and precludes their use in nonpublic,
high-return  investment  opportunities.  For this  reason,  mandated  contributions  as  compared  to
voluntary savings are seen  by  individuals as partially taxed.  The same problem  affects savings
through occupational pension plans.
129.  Mandatory  contributions  and  political  instability.  Another  drawback  of  mandatory
pensions is that they are vulnerable to political instability.  Since funds cannot be withdrawn under
any  circumstances not  specified  in the  law, the  credibility of  benefit  promises  depends on  the
perceived stability of the political and economic regime over the entire time horizon during which
individuals belong to the pension system (i.e., 60 years).  In contrast, this problem is lessened in the
case of voluntary pension  plans where members can react to  greater anticipated political risk by
withholding new savings and can often divert funds out of the country before they can be confiscated.
Thus, a first precondition  for the use of this  policy tool is a  political design that deals with this
problem.- 31  -
130.  More concretely, the political regime must be stable enough to ensure workers that it will
avoid future policy shifts, which are always an attractive option for populist politicians.  For example,
a shift away from full funding towards pay-as-you-go financing allows pension fund contributions to
be diverted to nonpension uses in the "short" run -- a number of decades -- which is politically very
attractive.  The cost to contributors is a reduction in the backing of benefit  promises, since their
benefits become dependent on the willingness of the government to tax the population in the future.
This decreases the credibility of future pension promises and increases the perceived tax component
of mandatory contributions. Future generations are made unambiguously worse off because tax rates
will be permanently higher in the long run after the first few decades such of such a policy shift.
131.  Further, if the local political system is based on patronage and clientelism (i.e., if politicians
base  their  appeal  on  the  distribution  of  favors  to  supporters), this  policy  tool  becomes  more
problematic, especially when a defined-benefit approach is adopted. This is because benefits must be
defined  in laws, but in many countries those laws distribute benefits less in relation to  individual
contributions  and  more  to  favor  the  politicians'  supporters.  As  the  link  between  individual
contributions and benefits defined by patronage becomes negligible, the perceived tax component of
mandatory contributions rises to 1  00 percent.
132  More generally, the political science  literature shows that  political instability  emerges  in
response to the forces that shape  of the state itself, such as international wars, the transition to a
patrDnage-free civil  service, and  democratization  of the  electorate  (Orloff,  1992).  Since  small
countries are more vulnerable in international wars, and a patronage-free civil service is difficult to
achieve  in the closely knit societies of  small countries, the type  of impersonal  political stability
needed for mandatory pension systems to operate well is less credible  in small  countries, ceteris
paribus.  The implication is that the policy tool of mandating contributions in exchange for pension
promises is less attractive in small countries.
133.  Both contribution-based and benefit-based systems can be designed to reduce the degree of
future exposure to political risk.  Examples are constitutional rules granting the status of property
rights to pension benefits, and use of professional panels whose advice cannot be overridden except
by new legislation (Diamond, 1996). Still, the most powerful means of insulating pension rights from
political  risks is to  require automatic  adjustment of  benefits to  available  revenue,  which occurs
natjrally  only in defined-contribution systems.  Thus, the greater potential political risks of mandating
contributions in small countries require at least:  (a) a defined-contribution approach to risk-sharing
between the beneficiaries of the pension system and the government, (b) constitutional protection of
property  rights associated with  individual pension fund accounts, and  (c)  professional  panels to
provide oversight.
134.  Mandated  contributions  and  costs  of  pension  system  administration.  Another
precondition for the use of mandatory contributions is that the state must be willing to devote enough
of its administrative resources to enforce the mandate.  Enforcement is easier to  impose on  large
firns,  since small  firms fade  easily  into the  informal sector, while  independent  workers remain
largely out of reach in most countries. Community workers, such as those in many African countries,
lack an agent that can be charged with the task of collecting contributions.
135.  Spending  on  enforcement  is  not an  all-or-nothing decision.  Many  countries  mandate
contributions only for "dependent workers," i.e., those who have an employer, because the employer
is easier to coerce.  In the past, Bolivian employers with fewer than 30 workers were exempt from- 32  -
supervision of their compliance with contribution requirements. At the other extreme, Sweden forces
independent workers to contribute by including an explicit "contribution tax"  within the  personal
income tax return.
136.  The effect of a country's size on enforcement costs is ambiguous. The cases of Singapore and
Switzerland  show that  small size may  increase  information about who  is doing  what,  reducing
enforcement costs.  On the other hand, the examples of Bolivia and Honduras show that small size
may  imply a  greater chance of lenient enforcement, because tax administration  is impaired.  For
example, tax inspectors cannot be rotated over a large enough set of independent interests in these
countries.  The  dilemma  for  a  small  country  is that  if  it contents  itself  with  a  low  degree  of
enforcement in order to save on enforcement costs, the number of contributors may be very small and
it may not reach economies of scale in other areas of the mandatory pension system. This suggests
that  countries where small size reduces enforcement costs  should strive for  100 percent coverage,
while countries where small size increases enforcement costs should choose between not using the
tool of a mandated pension system or accepting the high cost of using that tool.
137.  Labor mobility and the level of mandatory contribution rates.  The fact that mandatory
contributions are perceived as a  tax on (dependent) labor earnings has important implications for
small  countries, which experience greater international labor mobility. A type  of arbitrage occurs
when  an  improvident labor force  is willing to  work on  either  side  of a  border,  because  some
industries  choose  to  locate in the  side  with the  lowest  contribution rate.  For  this  reason,  small
countries that adopt mandatory contribution systems should content themselves with lower mandatory
contribution rates, accepting that improvident workers will achieve less coverage.
138.  Finally, mandated contributions are less effective as coverage of the active work force falls,
because fewer workers complete a full career of contributions due to continual rotation to uncovered
sectors. This problem is more significant in smaller countries with higher international labor mobility
per  capita,  assuming  that  workers do  not contribute when  abroad  and that  international treaties
allowing  for full portability of benefits are not effective. This means that improvident workers of
small  countries  contribute for  a shorter  portion of their working life, so their  improvidence will
continue to  hurt them in old age.  An option for small countries is to devote more resources to signing
and  enforcing  effective treaties  with other  countries, with the purpose  of enforcing  contribution
payments to mandatory pension systems on a cross-border basis.
C. Funding Requirements
139.  Pension  reform  is a  process that  attempts  to  either  improve  existing  pension  policy  or
establish  new  policies.  Two  critical  areas  in  small  countries  are  the  degree  of  funding  and
international portfolio diversification. In each of these areas, initial conditions present  in a specific
country have a significant impact on the optimal design of pension reform.
1. Funding
140.  Funding refers to the type of backing of pension promises.  Two types of  backing are: (a)
"apparent  funding,"  the  degree  to  which  pensions  are  backed  by  securities  covered  by  the
constitutional  protection of property rights, as opposed to  backing by  legislated promises  to pay- 33  -
benefits, which usually give rise to pay-as-you-go financing; and (b) "ultimate funding," which is the
degree to which  pension promises are backed by outside physical and/or foreign assets. Ultimate
funding excludes  government debt, which is backed by  future tax collections, and also excludes
consumer debt to the extent that it is backed by future earnings. The national saving rate will increase
in response to a pension reform only if it results in a greater degree of ultimate funding. An increase
in apparent  funding increases financial depth without an obvious impact on  national savings. For
example, if a pension system backed by legislated promises with pay-as-you-go financing is replaced
by  an apparently funded system where all funds are  invested in newly issued government bonds,
national savings would not increase.
141.  A pension system where pension rights are covered by constitutional protection for property
rights requires apparent  funding.  This occurs because, according to most constitutions, property
rights can be established  much more  firmly over  securities than  over  legislated promises  to pay
benefits in the future in some states of nature. One gain from this reform is that pension promises are
made more secure because their backing obtains constitutional protection for property rights.  Another
gain  is associated with international portfolio diversification, which  is discussed separately below,
given its significance for small countries.
142.  If the initial condition in the country is no mandatory system for private sector workers, and
mandated contributions will begin to be imposed on them, it is advisable to adopt both apparent and
ultinnate  funding.  If the initial condition is already apparent, the recommendation is to maintain it and
avoid any move towards pay-as-you-go financing.  If the country is in a stage of mature pay-as-you-
go  ilinancing, then  the  recommendation  is  to  shift  to  apparent  funding.  This  entails  replacing
government promises to  back the  pension social security  institutes'  promises to individuals, with
newly issued government bonds or with shares in state enterprises to be held by the social security
instiitutes. The interest paid by those bonds and equities will provide the social security institutes the
source of income they need to meet their promises to individuals.  Finally, if the country is in a stage
of immature pay-as-you-go financing, as most mandatory systems in the developing world are today,
the recommendation  is to shift immediately to apparent funding (see Valdes-Prieto, 1996 for more
details).
2.  ][nternational  Portfolio Diversification
143.  For a  small  country, this  allows  both  a  large  increase  in expected returns  and  a  large
reduction of risk. The higher expected return allows a substantial reduction in the contribution rate
required  to  finance  the  same  benefits, which  translates  into a  substantial gain  for workers.  As
explained above, reducing the contribution rate is especially valuable in a small country because of its
higher international labor mobility.  In a large country where asset markets are sufficiently developed,
the gains from international portfolio diversification are smaller because the domestic portfolio  is
already  quite  diversified.  The prerequisite for  international  portfolio diversification  is apparent
funding.
144.  To achieve the gains of international portfolio diversification, the social security institutes
must rebalance their portfolios away from government debt and purchase private sector assets instead,
most of them foreign assets. A massive unloading of government debt could produce problems in the
domestic debt  market of a  large country. However, in a  small country there would be much less
impact, because foreign investors are available to acquire the government debt without requiring large-34-
increases in interest rates. Similarly, the potential balance of payments problems that can arise from a
massive purchase of foreign assets by the social security institutes are much less significant in small
countries because foreign portfolio capital will flow in to buy the government bonds, balancing the
foreign exchange market.
145.  The above argument is subject to two provisos:  (a) that some small countries have adopted
policies  that  interfere  with  international  capital  flows,  and  (b)  that  the  international  financial
community tends to invest little in small countries about which there is little information.  In these
cases the process towards international portfolio diversification could bring the problems predicted
for larger countries.  Therefore, a precondition for successful pension reform  in small countries in
these circumstances is for them to abandon interference with international capital flows and to invest
in promoting themselves  to the  international financial community.  International organizations can
play a valuable role by permitting initial access to international  capital markets.
146.  It is sometimes argued that a reform towards apparent funding is not enough because it fais
to increase national saving rates, and therefore fails to reach a better endogenous growth path based
on higher investment and  its externalities. Some critics would prefer that a country move towards
ultimate funding or backing by outside assets.  However, in the case of a small country with an open
capital account, the extra growth due to the effect of "ultimate funding" on savings accumulation is
relatively less important than international portfolio diversification. This is because growth in a small
country is more dependent upon openness to  international trade  of goods, services, and  factors of
production than domestic savings accumulation.  Although an increase in ultimate funding increases
national savings, it does so at the sacrifice of the living generations. If this sacrifice is mandatory, it
entails higher tax rates or fewer public goods or both, which may be relatively harder to bear in small
countries, where international factor mobility constrains  the level of net tax rates relatively more. The
conclusion is that in small countries the critical pension reform is towards apparent funding, while the
net gains of moving towards ultimate funding are more debatable than in large countries.
147.  A common worry about pension systems is that they are vulnerable to local population risks
such as a drop in the local birth rate and an increase in domestic life expectancy.  Apparent funding
plus international portfolio diversification greatly reduces these risks in small countries. For example,
consider the risk that the population growth rate falls for a decade in a small country.  If the pension
benefits were backed by legislated promises alone (pay-as-you-go), the diversification task would be
transferred to the  local political system.  Even if the political system  reacted  optimally from  an
intergenerational risk-sharing perspective, which would mean increasing the  level of contributions
and reducing benefits as soon as the birth rate begins to fall, each generation would bear substantial
population risk.  In practice, most political systems do  nothing until contribution revenue actually
drops, which is too late.  By then the risk of a fiscal crisis becomes large, and that risk is worse in a
small country because it has little scope to increase tax rates in response to high international factor
mobility.  Contrast this  with  the outcome when the pension system  is apparently  funded and  the
portfolio is internationally diversified.  In this case pension benefits are barely affected because the
international capital  market  easily  absorbs  the  population risks  of  any  one  small  country,  so
contribution rates do not have to be altered.  In sum, a shift to apparent funding significantly reduces
the level of population uncertainty borne by each generation.
148.  Overall, for small countries the case in favor of relying on the capital market instead of on
legislated promises  is much stronger than  in large countries, provided the country  keeps an open
capital account.  The precondition for  this approach is a  reform  of the financing  system towards
apparent funding, meaning that pensions should be backed only by tradeable securities covered by- 35  -
constitutional  protection of property rights, as opposed to  backing by  legislated  promises to  pay
benefits.
VI.  PROVISOS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A.  Provisos
149.  This paper takes a  largely microeconomic perspective, so  important issues relating to the
fiscal implications of pension reform are not analyzed in detail. Neither does the paper focus on the
many important improvements that can be made in pay-as-you-go social security systems, which are
covered in Valdes-Prieto (1994) and James et al.  (1994).  Because of fiscal and political reasons,
these improvements in existing pay-as-you-go schemes need to be undertaken simultaneously or prior
to pursuing privatization and moving towards funding. Finally, the analysis mentions but does not
focus  in detail on the design and  regulation of occupational pension plans,  nor on  the voluntary
individualized defined contribution schemes often found in small countries.
150.  The paper finds that pension reforms are complex to design. Implementation is not treated in
detail but it is even more demanding, since consideration needs to be given to interaction with existing
pension policies and with  related reforms  in the  areas of health,  labor markets,  securities/capital
markets. privatization of nonfinancial companies, and housing finance. Moreover, these reforms raise
issues in such areas as political economy and  legal and  constitutional rights of contributors and
existing pensioners. In implementing any of the recommendations of this paper, such issues would
needi  to be carefully examined.
151.  Some of the issues that deserve further investigation are the design of transitions at the fiscal,
microeconomic, and political economy  levels. In particular, all transitions  in Latin America have
resulted in the coexistence of new privately managed funded pension systems with the old pay-as-
you.-go  financed and government-managed pension schemes. Countries such as Mexico are beginning
to examine options that may not involve the coexistence of the two regimes. This coexistence has not
been  smooth in several instances. Thus,  such types of reforms will be of  special  importance to
analyze in the future.
B. Recommendations
152.  The peculiarities of small countries have been shown by this paper to significantly influence
the outline of optimal pension policy.  These influences, which run from the broadest design to the
narrowest  political  considerations, are  particularly  important  at  the microeconomic  level.  The
conclusions and recommendations of the paper can be summarized under four categories: institutional
infiastructure to support pension services, supply of pension services, demand  for pension services,
and other considerations in pension policy and reform.- 36  -
1. Institutional Infrastructure to Support Pension Services
153.  In small countries, it is often assumed that lack of institutional infrastructure in such areas as
payment  systems;  lack  of  custody arrangements  for  securities;  inadequate registries  to  identify
contributors,  employers,  and  pensioners;  lack  of  a  broad  array  of  assets  for  investment;  and
inadequate financial information for the efficient provision of insurance or fund management services
will preclude the option of privatizing pension services (see Britran and Arrau, 1993).
154.  The preconditions  for the  institutional infrastructure needed in small  countries to  permit
partial or total  privatization of pension services  are no  greater and can even  be  less than  those
required in large countries.  Some important types of infrastructure can be imported by permitting
freer trade  in international financial services, including: custody services, offshore markets in which
to invest in local or foreign currency-denominated securities, and account processing services.  Some
services, such as registries of contributors and pensioners, are far more difficult to import, but other
services, such as supervision, can be "imported" if  investment management services are contracted
out to foreign firms.
155.  Institutional infrastructure and capacities needed within government agencies, e.g., domestic
infrastructure to  support a domestic  securities market, and accounting, auditing,  and  actuarial  or
valuation services, are shown to be highly dependent upon the exact type of pension reform proposed
and not only upon permitting poor small countries to have a "three pillar approach,' as advocated in a
recent World Bank study (1994). That approach can involve a pay-as-you-go first pillar, a mandatory
defined-contribution second pillar, and a voluntary occupational plan third pillar.  This is especially
true  if the  small  country  has no  infrastructure to enforce  a tax  transfer system, cannot  conduct
effective financial supervision, and does not have proper registries of contributors or pensioners.  By
contrast, pension systems that do  not entail any  mandatory contributions and  involve freedom to
contract with offshore providers of pension services imply far fewer infrastructure needs.
2.  Supply of Pension Services
156.  A number of important policy recommendations relating specifically to the supply of pension
services,  including  trustee  services,  involve  establishment  of  a  fiduciary  obligation  between
contributors and pension plan trustees designated by the govemment.  Among  the most important
findings in this area are:
(a)  There  is  a  need  to  ensure  reduced  concentration  in  the  trustee  function  by
considering the mandated unbundling of some pension services such as collection
and payment services, while perrnitting international competition in the provision of
other services, e.g., investment management and  insurance. This recommendation
results because permitting vertical integration back to the point of collections in small
countries can increase overall costs  in the pension industry and  result  in a  much
smaller number of trustees and  investment management entities, thereby  creating
incentives  for  collusion,  particularly  in  small  countries  that  lack  independent
interests.
(b)  Small countries with a  lack of independent interests need to give attention  to tie
number of trustees,  how  they  are  selected, and  the  supervisory, regulatory,  and- 37  -
corporate governance environment in which they  operate. The limited number of
independent interests in some small developing countries demands that there be at
least six trustees and that coordination among trustees be prohibited unless foreign
investments are very large. In addition, this  report shows that  in small countries
where  human capital  is scarce, it may  be best  to  permit  individual members  of
pension funds to choose the pension management trustee and board of directors, as
opposed to having trustees selected by the government or by employers and unions.
The  latter alternatives are shown to be fraught  with problems in small countries.
Such a recommendation presumes that regulations and supervision systems are put in
place to  ensure that the  pension fund trustees  have  incentives to  carry out their
fiduciary responsibilities  on behalf of fund members.
(c)  Providers of pension services need the  flexibility to  subcontract domestically  or
internationally for many pension services. This should include subcontracting for
data gathering, to permnit  the small country  to acquire pension services at  lowest
labor costs and to benefit from know-how.  Such concerns are far more critical in
small than in large countries, because the economies of scale  in such services and
associated  cost  reduction  will  be difficult  given  the  small  universe  of  eligible
labor. Permitting  international  subcontracting  of pension account  administration
and processing is also critical for companies operating in small countries to realize
efficiencies.  A  key  issue  regarding  the  latter  is  the  cost  of  transferring  the
information to the international processing company, which in turn depends on the
degree of competition in the international telecommunications  industry.
(d)  Regulations applied to  portfolio management in small countries should permit  or
even mandate that some proportion of the pension funds be invested in appropriately
rated offshore securities. This requirement permits intemational diversification.  It is
also  critical  in small countries that  do  not  have  a  sufficient  set of  independent
interests,  in order to  minimize the  possibilities  for  manipulating  local securities
markets  -- a  problem that  often arises  in small  countries as funds become large
relative  to  the  overall  size of the  domestic  securities  markets.  This  investment
regulation should be coupled with actions to permit free entry to foreign portfolio
management firms via direct provision of cross-border services without establishing
a  physical  presence. Such  policies,  in  combination,  could  make  the  investment
management industry in the small countries more contestable.
(e)  Mandatory provision of insurance services bundled together with pensions (such as
disability coverage or longevity insurance via the purchase of annuities) may not be
advisable in small countries. For example, in a small country the demands on scarce
human  capital needed to  set up  medical  boards  would  be  lessened if  disability
coverage were not made mandatory. Voluntary disability coverage may be offered to
employer groups established by  on and  offshore insurance companies or even by
efficient public agencies (in other countries); with fewer persons covered, the law of
large numbers may not apply, and mortality tables may be less reliable because of
the greater mobility of labor.  Thus, cross-border provision and direct investment by
foreign insurance carriers, including the purchase of reinsurance or annuities in the
international  markets,  should  be  permitted  subject  to  appropriate  regulatory
certification requirements by home and foreign supervisors.- 38  -
(f)  The relatively small size of the market for pension services in small countries, in
terms of both number of active contributors and level of wages, will limit the interest
of foreign direct investors in providing such services.  The paper shows that in the
case of markets with 200,000 to 400,000 active contributors and wage rates of about
US$ 200 to 400 per month (e.g., Bolivia) the flow of commission income into the
entire pension provision business will be between US$ 2 and US$  10 million per
year, depending on the commission rate. In this case  the desire of major foreign
companies to directly invest in setting up a branch or agency, and to form strategic
alliances with  domestic  companies, will  be  limited.  This  implies  an additional
argument for mandating the unbundling of pension services -- i.e., the small size of
these  markets could be less of an impediment to entry  if some services, such as
investment management, were less subject to high fixed costs upon entry.
3. Demand for Pension Services
157.  In the case of policy relating to the demand for pension services,  differences between the
small and large country case are not quite as dramatic as in the case  of supply. Three substantive
conclusions emerge:
(a)  It is important to avoid regulations that make demand for pension services insensitive
to  prices by  prohibiting differential pricing of pension services. Such  regulations
discourage price as opposed to nonprice competition. Although this type of problem
arises  irrespective of country size, it can be exacerbated  in small countries where
there  is greater  labor mobility.  Liberalization of commission structures  can help
reduce the nonprice competition and high commercialization of selling costs often
associated with private provision of pension services. Instead of needing to send
sales people to sway individuals to move from one pension provider to another, firmns
could then engage in greater price competition, which  would reduce costs  for all
participants.
(b)  Relative  to  large  countries, where some diversification  can  be obtained  through
domestic investments, in small countries the need for diversification, coupled with
people's  need to obtain a  "real" pension, implies that authorities should commit to
unrestricted  convertibility of  pension incomes  into domestic  currency, devoid  of
exchange  or  capital  controls.  Multilateral  institutions  could  provide transitory
guarantees  associated with  convertibility risk  to  ensure  that  a  pension  product
denominated in key international reserve currencies can emerge (e.g., U.S. dollars,
German marks, and yen). Capital controls can also impede the development of such
pension products, but this risk is more difficult to insure.
(c)  The  set  of  annuity  products  available  to  persons  reaching  retirement  in  small
countries should concentrate to  a much greater degree than  in large countries on
variable rate annuities.  Such annuities permit pensioners to take on some investment
risk to partially diversify inflation risk, which is particularly important -- and difficult
-- in small countries.  This result obtains because actual domestic inflation in small
countries can differ from inflation in the countries where some of the pension fund is
invested, even if the same currency is used.  Because this risk cannot be completely- 39  -
diversified,  in small countries variable rate annuities at retirement may be much
cheaper  than constant  real annuities  (i.e., index-linked  annuities defined in terms  of
the local  price index).
4. Other  Considerations  for Pension  Policy
158.  When  a small  contribution  base in small  countries  is combined  with other  characteristics  such
as relal:ively  greater  gross migration  flows, more  mobile  capital,  a lack  of independent  interests,  and a
shortage  of human  capital,  a number  of insights  emerge  forpolicymaking.  These include:
(a)  Pension policies involving the use of fiscal incentives (e.g. 401K plans, IRA
accounts, and tax incentives for personal occupational pension plans) are less
attractive  in small countries. Commonly  used  tax handles  that are simple enough  to
avoid costly tax administration  arrangements,  such as value added taxes or import
tariffs,  are not effective  in countering  the improvidence  of workers  -- a key objective
of pension  policy. The relatively  greater capital  and labor mobility in small, open
developing  countries  means that the tax base for imposing  a given fiscal incentive
will be less broad, so that such incentives  will be less likely to stimulate  saving and
insurance  for old age.
(b)  Mandating  contributions  in exchange  for rights to benefits,  as opposed to schemes
involving fiscal  incentives, carries potentially greater political risks in  large
countries. However,  such schemes  do address  the problem  of improvident  workers,
as well as failures  in intertemporal  insurance  markets,  more directly.  To mitigate  the
greater  political  risks in small countries,  mandated  contributions  should  involve:  4) a
defined contribution  approach to risk sharing between the beneficiaries  and the
government; (ii)  constitutional protection of  property rights  associated with
individualized  pension fund accounts;  and (ii) professional  or technical panels to
provide  oversight,  under strict  governance  processes.
(c)  Apparent funding (i.e., the degree to which pension obligations are backed by
various forms of securities,  inclusive  of government  securities)  is very important  in
small  countries,  whereas ultimate  funding  (i.e., backing  with outside  assets such as
physical  or foreign  assets)  is less critical  than in the large  country case.  This finding
results  because  in small countries  overall  economic  growth is far more dependent  on
openness to  intemational trade in goods, services, factors of  production, and
technology than on  domestic accumulation  of  savings and  new  knowledge.
Therefore,  the increase in domestic  savings  that a pension reform may promote  by
insisting  on ultimate funding is likely to be relatively less important in a small
country  with open borders. However,  moving  to a system with apparent funding  is
critical because the  ability to  back pension promises with  securities (even if
government  securities),  as opposed  to legislated  promises,  as in a typical  pay-as-you-
go system, reduces political risks.  In addition, a shift to apparent funding is a
prerequisite  for international  portfolio  diversification,  which is valuable  for smaller
countries  for reasons  explained  above.- 40  -
159.  From the perspective of World Bank policy advice and actions, four key implications emerge
from this study:
*  The need to encourage small open economies with a small base of contributors to permit
much  greater  international  competition  in  pension  services,  which  implies  that
establishment of a multi-pillar pension system (see James et al., 1994) may not always be
advisable.
*  The need to carefully analyze the links between the design of pension reforms and the
form of prudential regulatory or other  legal/regulatory reform being advocated.  For
example, minimum capital regulations for investment management companies may not
create significant fixed costs to new entrants  if collection of contributions is vertically
disintegrated and processing services are subcontracted.  This result holds, because such
design would  imply the need  for less  initial capital by  prospective  entrants  offering
investment management services.
*  The need  to  encourage  much  greater  harmonization  in certain  key  regulations  and
coordinated supervision across countries to facilitate greater cross-border provision of
pension services.
*  The  need  to  evaluate  how  World  Bank  financial  products  such  as  convertibility
guarantees might be used to permit development of more diversified pension products
involving investments in multi-currency portfolios for demanders of pension services.
Such guarantees are needed given that authorities would need to commit to unrestricted
convertibility of pension incomes into domestic currency without exchange  or capital
controls.- 41  -
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INSTITUTIONAL  INFRASTRUCTURE  AND PENSION  SERVICES
1.  The shortage of human capital in some small relative to large developing  countries, and
the associated lack  of  certain key types of  institutional infrastructure, can undermine the
effectiveness and  overall  credibility  of  pension  reforms  involving  partial  or  complete
privat;ization.  However, the Chilean example is often cited to suggest that the implementation
of "the privatization option" leads to the more efficient provision of an entire set of related
infrastructure i.e.,  registries of different types, custody arrangements for securities, collection
and clearing of payments, development  of supervision  capacity for providers of financial (e.g.,
securities and banking) and pension services, and even improvements in tax or other forms of
collection systems.  Development of this infrastructure is viewed as resulting in a form of
positive externality associated with privatization  of pension services.
2.  The objective of this Annex is to identify the institutional infrastructure that will need
to be present prior to implementation  of different pension reform options in small countries.
Section A provides a basic conceptual  framework  within which to evaluate different options for
pension reform through the public or private provision of infrastructure services.  Section B
examines the appropriate role of the government in the provision of these services within the
conceptual framework outlined in Section A.  Finally, Section C identifies the most essential
infrastructure services that  will have to  be present to ensure  that pension reform options
involving  partial or complete privatization  of pension services  can be realized.
A.  General Framework
3.  Two  basic  questions  need  to  be  addressed  when  determining  the  institutional
infrastructure required to support pension reform.  First, what conceptual framework can be
used to assess the degree to which these forms of infrastructure need to be wholly publicly or
privately provided? Second, what types of institutional  infrastructure are essential to support or
complement  the public or private provision of pension services?
4.  Public versus private provision of institutional infrastructure  to support pension
services. Based on the theory of industrial organization  as applied to physical infrastructure, it
is possible to classify the types of institutional  infrastructure  needed to support pension services
according to  the degree to which they are public goods. The classification process involves
assessing each type of institutional infrastructure  from the perspective of consumers, in terms
of the nature of the good and vis-a-vis the nature and conditions of production.
5.  Nature of  the  good or  service.  This  refers  to  the  degree of  subtractability or
excludability in consumption of a specific good or service.  Here subtractibility, or rivalry,
refers to the impact that consumption  by incremental or additional users has on consumption
opportunities of all users.  A purely  private good can be consumed  by only one person at a time
(e.g., food or typical consumer goods).  At the other extreme, a purely public good that is not
extractable is clean air,  since consumption by one individual does not lessen availability to- A2  -
others the good or service is jointly consumed. Between  these extremes are goods that may not
become  subtractable until  the  use  reaches a  certain level  (e.g.,  highways  and  related
congestion).  Excludability refers to the feasibility of controlling access to the good. Some
goods (e.g., air), or even different types of information  produced by companies (e.g., ratings),
may not be very excludable in consumption.  Exclusion is more costly the more public the
good is in consumption. Finally, some goods (e.g., a piped sewerage system) are characterized
by  exclusivity but  are  not  subtractable.  By contrast, common pool  goods (e.g.,  water
resources) are characterized  by low excludability  but are subtractable.
6.  It is extremely important to note that the nature of a  good or  service is not static,
technology can have extremely important implications for the degree to which a good can be
characterized as public.  For example, some highways are no longer considered public due to
the invention of electronic road pricing,  which has made it  less costly to  restrict access.
Technology will tend to effect the marginal costs of consumption, the costs of exclusion, and
the extent of congestion.
7.  The  nature of  production.  Production aspects,  such  as  the  degree  of  natural
monopoly due  to  sunk costs  or  scale/scope economies or  the  degree  of  coordination in
production, can each act to create situations where some government role may be needed.
Natural monopoly, or more formally, subadditivity,  of costs in production, occurs when there
are substantial economies of scale or scope, so that average costs continue to  decline for  the
entire range  of output  produced. Thus natural monopoly implies that the market will be best
served by one supplier.  However, if entry is free and the production of the good or service is
not characterized by  sunk costs,  even a  natural monopoly need not  imply noncompetitive
pricing if the market is contestable. A concept related to but distinct from natural monopoly is
coordination. In some areas of infrastructure,  networks require spatial coordination and some
form of harmonized  rules (e.g., electric power, vehicle  traffic).
8.  As in the case of consumption of the good or service, the degree to which production
must  involve a  government role,  through either  direct provision  or  regulation, depends
importantly on technological advances that can affect the entire cost function of the industry.
Technological options can affect the degree of scale economies and the degree of sunk costs
present in an industry.
9.  Externalities and social objectives.  Externalities  occur when the costs (benefits) of
producing or consuming the good affect third parties (persons not directly involved in the
transaction).  There can be either positive or negative externalities where these are a function
of the good or  service.  Vehicle traffic leads to  ill effects on air,  water, etc.  Water and
sanitation services will positively affect health.  Some goods (e.g.,  voice telecommunications)
are characterized  by what are called network externalities, where all users benefit when a new
subscriber gains access to a network.  Finally, certain minimum social or political objectives
may be valued by the community, such as universal access to a certain level of service (e.g.,
water), or there may be social benefits beyond those accruing to individual users.  These so-
called merit goods have positive social externalities  of consumption.- A3  -
B.  Application  of the Framework  to Pension  Services  Infrastructure
10.  Table  1 classifies the different types of infrastructure often associated with pension
services into two types -- Type 1 and Type 2.  Type 1 goods and services are those which have
some attributes associated with public goods, but need not be publicly provided.  In contrast,
Type 2 goods and services are generally thought to require public provision because they are
nonsubtractable or excludable in consumption, or are needed due to information (or market)
failures.  For  example, the judicial  system/legal framework are  examples of  services the
government may have to provide, because these services  are not characterized by excludability
in consumption. In the case of supervision, information  failures in insurance markets related to
adverse selection  or moral hazard and the mandatory nature of contributions, suggest the need
for supervision and regulation  -- although this role must be carefully  circumscribed.- A4  -
Table 1.  Institutional  Infrastructure  for Pension  Services
ACTIVITIES  NATURE  OF  PRODUCTION  ASPECTS  EXTERNALITIE
GOOD/SERVICE  S OR SOCIAL
Degree of  Degree of  Degree of  Economies of  Degree of  OBJECTIVES
Subtractability  Excludability  Sunkness  Scale or  Coordination  INVOLVED
Scope
Type I
1.  Registries  a!  M-L  M-L  L  L  ma,  H
2.  Custody services  H  H  Mb/  Mb/  L-M  M
3.  Payments  services  M  M  M-H  M  L-M  M-H
4.  Accounting  L  L  L  L  L  M
5.  Auditing  M  M  L  L  L  M
6.  Actuarial  services  M  M  L  L  L  M
7.  Collection  services  M-H  M  M  M-H  L  M-H
8.  Mortality  tables  H  M  L  L  L  M
9.  Financial  analysis  (valuation)  M  M  M-L  L  L  M-L
and ratings  of securities
10. Telecommunications  M  M-L  M-L  M-L  L  L
Type  2
1.  Supervision  L  L  L  M  H  H
2.  Legal  framework  L  L  1  L  H  H
3.  Judicial  system  L  L  L  L  H  H- A5  -
Definitions:  (H=high, M=moderate,  L=low, NA=not applicable)
Subtractability  (or rivalry)  refers to the impact  that  consumption  by incremental  users  has on consumption  opportunities  of all users. Low subtractability
(nonrivalry)  implies  that consumption  by one user does not impede  availability  to other  users (such  goods are jointly  consumed). High subtractability
implies  that  consumption  by one  user imposes  identifiable  costs  on other  users  (privately  consumed  goods).
Excludability  refers to the feasibility  of controlling  access to a good. High excludability  implies  that it is relatively  easy (noncostly)  to prevent users
from consuming  it.
Sunkness  refers  to the extent  of sunk  capital  costs  incurred  in the event  of exit  from the activity. In activities  with high  contestability,  entry and exit  are
relatively  costless. This  implies  the absence  of sunk  costs.
Coordination  refers to the need  to control  the rights to perform  this  function.
Externalities  refers to cases where the good or service  produced  is nonexcludable  in consumption,  so that third parties are affected  when the good is
produced  or consumned.  Externalities  can be positive  or negative.
a/ In particular,  unique  identification  numbers  must  be established  for each  contributor.- A6  -
11.  Table 1 highlights the fact that many forms of Type 1 goods or services, such as those
affecting quality of information (1, 4,  5,  6,  9), custody and payment services (2,  3), and
communications infrastructure (10) are characterized by certain externalities.  Also, Type 1
goods and services have varying degrees of "publicness"  in either consuniption or production.
For example, the nonexistence of accurate information in a registry to  identify contributors
results in a form of externality, since it increases  transaction  costs to all consumers of pension
services through its impact on collection and by increasing account and information processing
costs.  In addition, the possibilities for fraud increase, with associated negative externalities  to
individual contributors who obey the statutes.  Finally, although subtractability (rivalry) and
excludability  in consumption  are not high for this service, production can involve some degree
of sunk costs, so that scale economies may require some form of regulation but not necessarily
outright public provision.
12.  Custody and payment services are basic to the development  of any form of privatization
of investment  management services.  This is because securities must be warehoused in a way
that ensures that when securities transactions are undertaken, counterparties have confidence
that securities accounts will be properly credited  and debited. Similarly, payment services must
be  timely and  there must  be  rapid transfer of  funds associated with  securities trading.
However, production of these services is characterized by some scale economnies  that can be
important in the small country context, implying that care needs to be taken in the design of
government regulation.  Finally, communications  infrastructure can be critical, particularly in
small countries where access to offshore provision of some infrastructure services is central to
the functioning  of the pension system.  Thus, it is important  to ensure that phone lines exist and
that there are no barriers to interfacing between  data systems  across countries.
13.  A last Type 1 service of particular importance to pension reform, irrespective of the
size of the country relates to  collections (7).  In  this case, collections can be  subject to
significant economies of scale and scope.  Economies of scale exist because fixed costs of a
network of offices, and a labor force to collect contributions and enforce collections, can be
large. Also, the need for each company that acts as a retention agent on behalf of workers to
create  many new  forms  (planillas) every  time  workers change  employers can  increase
collection costs dramatically. Such costs  can be  reduced substantially if  the  number of
collection agents and associated infrastructures  are reduced.  Economies of scope are present
due to the joint nature of many government collection functions.  For example, contributions
for social security, unemployment insurance, personal income taxes, and health services, if
provided by a separate public agency, are often collected separately using different forms, and
even via separately created infrastructure in some countries.  Assigning all of these collection
functions  (within one standardized  form) to one collection system per employer has been shown
to result in large cost savings.
14.  This kind of analysis  does not imply that Type 1 goods should be publicly provided. In
many cases (e.g., registries, custody, and payments), the goods or services to be provided can
be regulated via external regulation or self-regulatory  standards set by associations (chambers
of commerce in the case of registries, associations of accountants  or actuaries, etc.), and by
self- regulatory organizations (SROs) exchanges, and clearing houses.  More often than not,- A7  -
some combination of these two forms of oversight is applied to mitigate externalities (see
Glaessner,  1994).  It  is  important to  note that enforcement of  these regulations requires
adequate supervisory capacity within the external regulatory authority to evaluate the adequacy
of the oversight imposed through the self-regulatory  association or organization.  Finally, even
in thbe  case of collections, an assessment will have to be made of the existing infrastructure for
collecting payments from the general public before the government is assumed to be the sole
collection agent, as opposed to options involving the contracting out or concessioning (out-
sourcing) of this service.
15.  Experience in many developing countries, irrespective of size, suggests that substantial
weaknesses exist in delivery of most Type 2 services that usually must be provided by the
public sector.  Although legal and regulatory reforms can be  effected quickly, changes to
improve judicial processes and supervision in areas needed to support a complete or partial
privatization  of pension services  take time and can be quite extensive. For example, there often
will be a need to vastly upgrade supervision of securities markets, banking, insurance, and all
forrns of pensions, whether mandatory or voluntary.
C.  The Small Country Case: Selected Types of Institutional  Infrastructure
and Pension Services
16.  In small countries, several factors make the related decisions regarding the nature of
pension reform and the approach to development  of institutional  infrastructure highly complex.
The Type 1 and Type 2 services indicated in Table 1 can be evaluated in the small country case
by grouping the activities into six categories.  These include: (a) registries to  identify the
contributors or verify the age of pensioners; (b) collection services, which are discussed in
greater detail in Section III of the main text; (c) custody and payment services; (d) services
relating to the quality of information available to the govermnent or private agents to monitor
or evaluate the performance of pension funds';  (e) capacity to  supervise; and (f) important
legal/regulatory issues associated with  general governance or  with conflicts of  interest in
providing investrnent  advice and fund management  services to third parties.
17,  Registries.  Accurate registries comprise one  type of  infrastructure that  may be
developed more rapidly in small than in large countries. The costs of verifying the identity of
contributors and pensioners can be reduced given the much smaller contribution base and work
force.  At the same time, if some modern telecommunications  technology is present, it may be
possible to easily link up the civil registries (if physically separate) via computerization. If this
service is publicly provided or contracted out to the private sector, it will be  important to
develop techniques for ensuring the accuracy of the basic information  collected in the registry
in  association with different government agencies. This  supervisory function will require
deployment of human capital, which is scarcer in small than in larger developing countries.
'/  These include  services such as registries, accounting,  auditing,  actuarial  services, and valuation  and
ratings.  See numbers  1, 4, 5, 6, and 9 in Table 1.- A8  -
18.  In addition to the civil and social security-related  registries, other registries related to
taxes,  companies,  real  estate,  land,  movable  goods,  and  securities are  essential  to  the
development of the capacity to supervise  pension services if pension funds make investments in
domestic currency-denominated  securities.  At the same time, such registries serve as the key
source of information critical to the capacity of private market participants to monitor pension
fund  administrators, investment management companies,  insurance companies,  and  other
entities providing aspects of pension services.  Many of these services can be provided by
private vendors or associations  (e.g., chambers of commerce), as is the case in Colombia.  In
addition, private credit bureaus or broad-based databases can be developed (e.g.,  DICON in
Chile) to serve as invaluable sources of information to both supervisory agencies and private
economic agents seeking to ascertain  the creditworthiness  of individuals  or companies.
19.  Despite  these  advantages  in  developing  registries,  small  countries  can  face
disadvantages related to  labor migration.  Specifically, such migration flows can  make it
difficult for government or the private sector to establish and maintain a registry of  active
contributors, which involves establishing national identity numbers.  In essence, this requires
coordination between the authorities  responsible  for immigration and those that must supervise
and regulate whatever public or private pension systems are in place.
20.  Collection services.  Development  of a collection infrastructure  also presents difficult
problems in  small countries, particularly where personal income tax systems are not  well
developed and there is no publicly provided collection infrastructure. For exarnple, Costa Rica
is one of the few Central American countries that has a well functioning personal income tax
collection regime.  In most small countries more convenient tax handles have to be employed,
such as export taxes or the value added tax (VAT).  These tax systems, however, do not result
in an infrastructure that can support collection of contributions to individual pension accounts
out of wages.  These countries  may have collection infrastructure  present at the individual level
in the case of  key services such as water and electricity; however, piggybacking on this
infrastructure to  collect contributions for  workers is  difficult, since the link between the
employer and employee is severed. In most small countries collections  must be effected by the
employer through retentions and placed in accounts at commercial banks.  Thus, a key issue
involves standardizing  the forms and process for collections  in each company (e.g., establishing
the planilla) and automating  this process.  An entire set of issues arises in small countries when
collections  are undertaken by different fund management  companies that can vertically integrate
(see Section m of main report).
21.  Custody, clearing, and settlement  services and payment  systems. Custody functions
(warehousing of securities), clearing functions 'determining accountability  for the exchange of
money and  securities between buyers and  sellers of  securities), and  settlement functions
(completing transactions by  delivering or  crediting securities and  corresponding funds  to
appropriate accounts) can be organized in a decentralized or completely centralized manner.
Similarly, payments in small countries can take the form of large value transfers or,  more
often, checks.- A9  -
22.  In small countries many of these services  are characterized by some economies of scale
in production over  the relevant number of securities or  payment transactions.  Typically,
economies can be realized if the number of securities transactions processed is more than ----
per day. Obtaining such economies and related cost reductions will only be present in small
countries if each has no more than one entity (e.g.,  a clearing house, exchange, or custody
corporation) providing such services as custody and clearing of securities or checks.  In small
countries such as Bolivia, Cdsta Rica, and El Salvador, a lack of independent  interests, coupled
with the need to reduce the number of providers of the service to capture scale economies, can
lead.  to a situation where provision of these services  by domestic market participants  results in a
forrn of self-regulated oligopoly or monopoly.  Hence, experience suggests (see Glaessner,
1994) that care must be taken to permit objective entry to domestic exchanges or custody
corporations and to carefully evaluate the option of importing these types of services from
abroad.
23.  Finally, it is essential that barriers to the links between international and domestic
payment systems (often involving impediments  to modern telecommunications  technology by
government-created local monopolies) be eliminated.  In this case, payment system services
involving international currencies, e.g.,  participation  in SWIFT) can be more easily imported
from abroad.
24.  Quality of information and valuation services.  The lack of independent  interests in
small countries and  the related greater possibilities for  collusion among pension  service
providers suggests that the quality of information  and valuation takes on added importance. In
particular,  the need to  import services will require that consumers have greater access to
information  about offshore providers of pension and insurance  services. In addition, improving
the quality of information will require a substantial investment in human capital.  In many
small countries, the actuarial, auditing, and accounting standards, as defined by self-regulatory
associations, are very  underdeveloped.  Estimates suggest that there are very  few trained
actuaries, accountants, and auditors within the Central American countries, and in some of
these countries they are almost nonexistent.  The problem of the lack of human capital is
compounded by  a  lack of  independent interests, which greatly  impedes the reliability of
information provided about most financial and income statements.  Relative to large countries
there is a much higher probability that the opinions rendered by persons in these professions,
and the applicable information  provided, is not independent  from the interests of the providing
institutions.
25.  Supervision.  Given  the  greater  shortage of  human  capital in  small developing
countries, it is important to find ways to minimize the investments small countries must make
in  this area.  One  method of minimizing these costs  is to  place  far  greater emphasis on
information disclosure  and  on  designing regulations that  can  create  incentives for  self-
reg,ulation  by the financial institutions that provide pension-related services.  This does not
imiply  the complete absence of supervision; rather, it implies strengthened -- but far  more
focused -- supervision and  adoption of a  far  more modern approach to financial services
supervision. Alternatively, supervision services  can be imported if pension reform involves the- AIO  -
complete contracting out  of  pension  services to  foreign entities that  will  be  subject to
supervision by the home country supci  visor (see Section  D below).
26.  Legal framework: corpor  ate  governance,  conflicts  of  interest,  and  investment
management.  Besides the  immediate need to  design specific aspects of  the legal  and
regulatory framework for the supply and demand for pension services (see Section III of main
paper), there will typically  'be  the need to reform substantial parts  of the legal regulatory
framework in a complementary mainner. In small countries there is often a relative lack of
independent interests, and consequently, a greater concentration of ownership.  This implies
that regulatory and  legal  frameworks will need to  be  designed with  special attention to
governance and conflict of interest.  Regulations employed to tackle these issues involve: (a)
defining very clear investment objectives  and policies; (b) examining the fiduciary liability of
directors of investment  management companies, trustees, pension plan sponsors, or those on
special investment  policy committees, if the country adopts a govenmment-operated  plan; and
(c) establishing  proper valuation and trading practice standards, many of which are difficult to
enforce in  domestic securities markets, which are  not  highly liquid.  Finally,  auditing,
valuation, and disclosure standards can also be manipulated  and compliance functions may not
be well developed, making the risk of fraud, dumping of securities, and improper assigrnent
of transactions  frequent problems.
D.  Options for Development of Institutional Infrastructure  to Support
Pension Reform
27.  The above discussion might make it appear that small countries should not implement
mandated pension  schemes, if  only  because the infrastructure requirements appear  more
difficult to meet in a country with a small, very mobile contribution base.  If such schemes  are
adopted, however, they need to meet minimum infrastructure  requirements, as.  well as provide
access to offshore services.
28.  Types of pension reform  and  minimum  set of institutional  infrastructure.  The
types of  institutional infrastructure that will be  needed to  support pension reform are not
independent  of the specific characteristics  of the reform adopted.  For example, if the reform
involves the mandating of contributions, certain services will be essential to the government's
ability to  enforce its  pension policy (e.g.,  tax authorities, perhaps  military/police, some
regulatory/supervisory  body, and an adequate legal framework/judicial system).  In addition,
some forms of infrastructure will be needed to ensure that contributions are collected at fairly
low cost and that benefits will be paid out in a timely fashion. For example, this would require
the existence of adequate registries to identify both contributors and pensioners, as well as
some form of privately or publicly provided infrastructure  for collections.
29.  If pension services are wholly or partially privatized, given investments in domestic
markets, an entire set of infrastructure relating to the quality of information will be required,
such  as  actuarial  services,  valuation and  ratings of  securities,  accounting and  auditing
standards, and mortality tables with which to  assess longevity risk.  Complete or  partial- All  -
privatization of pension services in such areas as investment  management  also gives rise to the
need for reforms relating to payment systems and custody for securities, as well as legal or
regulatory reforms to treat conflicts of interest and define the fiduciary responsibility of fund
managers.  Finally, privatization of pension services can require greater efforts to upgrade
supervision so that different types of regulations and legislation  can be enforced, to reduce the
risks of insolvency  and fraud on the part of private providers.
30.  By contrast, if pension reforms are designed so that govermnent would only mandate
contributions, enforce and create a collection system (involving out-sourcing to commercial
banks),  set  certain  minimum standards  for  a  pension contract,  and  license  well-known
international companies to  offer  that contract to  local contributors, domestic institutional
infrastructure requirements can be minimal.  Maintaining the real purchasing power of such
pensions can present interesting  issues (see Section  IV B.).
31.  In sum, the design of pension reform in small countries can greatly affect how much
institutional infrastructure  will be required.  In each country, difficult decisions will need to be
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